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Abstract
We study the determinants of youth crime using a dynamic discrete choice model of crime and
education. We allow past education and criminal activities to aﬀect current crime and educational
decisions. We take advantage of a rich panel dataset on serious juvenile oﬀenders, the Pathways
to Desistance. Using a series of psychometric tests, we estimate a model of cognitive and so-
cial/emotional skills that feeds into the crime and education model. This allows us to separately
identify the roles of state dependence, returns to experience, and heterogeneity in driving crime
and enrollment decisions among youth. We ﬁnd small eﬀects of experience and stronger evidence of
state dependence for crime and schooling. We provide evidence that, as a consequence, policies that
aﬀect individual heterogeneity (like social/emotional skills), and those that temporarily keep youth
away from crime, can have important and lasting eﬀects even if criminal experience has already
accumulated.
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1 Introduction
Understanding what determines crime among youths can be very useful for designing policies to reduce
not only youth crime, but crime rates overall. The empirical evidence suggests that youth account for a
large share of crime in the United States. In 1997, law enforcement oﬃcials arrested 2.8 million people
under the age of 18, accounting for one ﬁfth of all arrests (Snyder and Sickmund, 1999). There is also
evidence that crime is becoming increasingly concentrated among teenagers. The rate at which juveniles
were arrested for murder and violent crime rose 177% and 79%, respectively between 1978 and 1993,
about three times the increase for adults over the same period (Levitt, 1998). Furthermore, numerous
studies have found that criminal activity is highly persistent over time ((Blumstein, Farrington, and
Moitra, 1985; Nagin and Paternoster, 2000, 1991)), which suggests that attempts to reduce youth crime
may have large eﬀects on adult crime as well.1
In this paper we study the determinants of youth crime in the context of a joint dynamic discrete
choice model of crime and education in which previous and current education and criminal activities
aﬀect current crime and educational decisions. Understanding the relationships between crime and
education has important policy implications. To the extent that education and crime interact, this
provides additional instruments for policy makers interested in reducing crime and/or increasing edu-
cational attainment.
Recently there has been an increased recognition in the literature that education may be an impor-
tant driver of criminal behavior, in a variety of ways. Increased educational attainment may increase
future wages, which increases the return to legitimate work and raises the opportunity cost of illicit
behavior (Freeman, 1996; Lochner, 2004). Schooling may alter people's preferences, for example by in-
creasing patience or risk aversion (Becker and Mulligan, 1997; Usher, 1997; Fajnzylber, Lederman, and
Loayza, 2002). Education may directly aﬀect the psychic or ﬁnancial rewards from crime by emphasiz-
ing social and emotional development (Lochner, 2011). Schooling can also have an incapacitation eﬀect
(Freeman, 1996; Lochner, 2004; Jacob and Lefgren, 2003), or it can cause increased criminal activity
by increasing the concentration of young people, leading to more violent confrontations (Jacob and
Lefgren, 2003) or increased drug-related oﬀenses by bringing together buyers and sellers.2 Schooling
can aﬀect social networks, and these networks could inﬂuence criminal behavior, for example via gang
1In addition to the direct beneﬁts to society of reducing crime, there are also indirect beneﬁts. Research has found that
incarceration negatively aﬀects future earnings of individuals (Jacob and Lefgren, 2003; Grogger, 1998, 1995). Moreover,
higher levels of crime have been found to reduce incentives for investment (Zelekha and Bar-Efrat, 2009).
2The literature is inconclusive on the direction of the eﬀect of contemporaneous education on crime. Farrington et al.
(1986), and Witte and Tauchen (1994) ﬁnd that time spent at school is associated with lower levels of criminal behavior.
Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006) ﬁnd that being in school causes a drop in property crime, but an increase in
violent crime. Anderson (2014) ﬁnds that schooling is negatively associated with both property and violent crime rates.
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participation (Lochner, 2010).
There are also channels through which crime can aﬀect educational decisions. Having a criminal
record may reduce the probability of obtaining a legitimate job, or may reduce the expected wage,
lowering the returns to education (Hansen, 2011; Kim, 2014). Criminal experience may also increase
the returns to criminal activity, thus lowering the relative returns to legitimate work and therefore
education (Loughran et al., 2013). This could also, in turn, feed back into crime choices.
Because we observe individuals over many years, we are able to account for both of these possibilities.
The data we employ comes from the Pathways to Desistance (PD), a multi-site longitudinal study of
serious adolescent oﬀenders as they transition from adolescence into early adulthood. The Pathways to
Desistance was designed speciﬁcally to study questions related to the evolution of criminal behavior,
taking special care to also measure educational decisions and outcomes. As a result, the dataset contains
a rich panel of information about decisions to participate in crime and enroll in school. This allows us
to construct the criminal history of an individual for diﬀerent crime categories as well as his educational
experience and enrollment decisions over time. This type of data is ideally suited for understanding
the dynamics in crime and education since it follows individuals over time. The enrolled youth were
between 14 and 18 years old at the time of their committing oﬀense and were found guilty of a serious
oﬀense. Each study participant was followed for a period of seven years past enrollment which results
in a comprehensive picture of life changes in a wide array of areas over the course of this time.3
Our extremely rich set of control variables allows us to separate the eﬀects of experience (captured
by the accumulation of education and crime) from contemporaneous eﬀects of education on crime, and
from the eﬀects of individual heterogeneity. Furthermore, we are able to separately account for the
eﬀects of state dependence in these decisions (captured by lagged decisions). Being able to separate
these channels is important for evaluating potential policies aimed at either reducing crime or increasing
educational attainment. For example, if there are large positive returns to criminal experience, then
interventions to reduce crime need to be taken at early ages before experience accumulates. If instead
the returns to experience are low, but there is a high degree of state dependence, then policies can be
impactful at any age, but need to be repeated as the lagged eﬀects depreciate.
The relationship between crime and education has been studied using a variety of datasets, including
the NLSY79 (Grogger, 1998; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Lochner, 2004), the NLSY97 (Merlo and
Wolpin, 2009), the Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study (Imai and Krishna, 2004; Tauchen, Witte, and
Griesinger, 1994), the National Youth Survey (Imai, Katayama, and Krishna, 2006), the National
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Mocan and Rees, 2005), among others. A common feature of
3We describe the dataset in more detail in Section 2.
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these datasets is that they study subsets of the population at large, and are not focused particularly on
criminals.4 For instance, the participation rate in violent and property crime in the NLSY79 averages
6.8% and 11.8% for individuals aged between 20 and 23 years old with 12 years of schooling (Lochner,
2004).
While these datasets are useful for examining what drives people over the threshold between non-
criminal and criminal behavior, they are not well-suited for studying serious criminal behavior, as
they include very few serious oﬀenders and few serious crimes. For policy makers interested in reducing
overall crime rates, particularly violent crime rates, then data on these serious oﬀenders, who contribute
signiﬁcantly to aggregate crime rates, is necessary.
An advantage of studying only serious oﬀenders through the PD data, is that to the extent there is
unobserved heterogeneity that leads some individuals to become serious oﬀenders, we are more likely to
be working with people who are on a criminal trajectory (adolescence-limited, high-level chronics and
low-level chronics as deﬁned by Nagin and Land, 1993 and Nagin, Farrington, and Moﬃtt, 1995). While
selecting on serious oﬀenders has its advantages, one limitation is that we cannot necessarily generalize
our ﬁndings to the population at large. The data are also less useful for studying the transition to
becoming a serious oﬀender, as we only observe those individuals that have done so.
The PD data includes a much richer set of targeted control variables than is typically available. In
addition to standard socio-economic variables and information about their families, the dataset also
contains a number of additional individual-level variables that are particularly useful for our analysis.
In each year the data contain a measure of each individual's perception about their probability of being
caught if they committed a crime.5 It also has information about drug usage, involvement in crime by
family members, and a measure of how each individual discounts future events.
An additional beneﬁt of this dataset is that, in addition to very detailed survey questions, individuals
are also given a series of tests designed to measure unobserved heterogeneity, namely cognitive and
social/emotional skills. Numerous studies have established that cognitive ability is a strong predictor
of schooling attainment and wages (Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2001; Murnane, Willett, and Levy,
1995), as well as a range of social behaviors (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994). Recently, an emerging
body of research shows the eﬀects of social/emotional ability (sometimes referred to as non-cognitive
ability) on outcomes such as labor market participation, test scores, health, and migration (Borghans,
Meijers, and Ter Weel, 2008; Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Cobb-Clark and Tan, 2011; Chiteji,
4An exception is the dataset used by Witte (1980) which follows a set of men released from prison in North Carolina.
That dataset covers only adults and does not incorporate education decisions.
5Empirical estimates of crime deterrence based on the perceived certainty or severity of punishment on crime provide
mixed results (Lochner, 2007; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996; Bachman, Paternoster, and Ward, 1992; Pogarsky and
Piquero, 2003).
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2010; Jaeger et al., 2010), which suggests a possible role for social/emotional skills in predicting criminal
activity as well. Another strand of empirical research has focused on understanding the factors that
aﬀect the evolution of cognitive and non-cognitive skills and how relevant this is for building optimal
interventions (Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha and Heckman, 2007; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010).
Focusing speciﬁcally on crime, Hill et al. (2011) show that several interventions that focus on person-
ality rather than cognitive skills were eﬀective at reducing delinquency and traits related to delinquency.
Also, Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua (2006) show that both cognitive and non-cognitive skills inﬂuence
risky activities such as smoking by age 18, imprisonment, and participation in illegal activities. Al-
though the economic literature on the eﬀect of social/emotional skills on crime is limited, research from
criminology and psychology has estimated correlations between IQ, measures of personality, and crime.
This literature ﬁnds signiﬁcant correlations between personality measures such as self-control, restraint,
negative emotionality and crime/delinquency (Caspi et al., 1994; Agnew et al., 2002; Pratt and Cullen,
2000).
Incorporating these additional measures of observed and unobserved heterogeneity not only aids in
separately identifying the various channels driving observed crime and education decisions. They also
represent additional potential instruments for policy makers. To the extent that behavioral problems
or drug use aﬀect criminal activity, this provides additional opportunities to aﬀect criminal behavior
among youth by reducing drug use and/or improving social/emotional skills.
As a preview of our results, we ﬁnd that measures of individual heterogeneity are important in
explaining the patterns of enrollment and crime choices. In particular, many of the measures less
commonly observed in datasets, such as drug use, involvement in crime by family members, attitudes
towards the future, and both cognitive and social/emotional skills, have some of the largest eﬀects. We
also ﬁnd evidence of important dynamics. State dependence leads to the strongest eﬀects, but there is
also evidence of returns to experience as well.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our data from the Pathways to
Desistance. Section 3 contains our joint dynamic discrete choice model of crime and education. Section
4 presents the empirical results from our model, as well as a number of robustness checks. In Section




Our data come from the Pathways to Desistance (PD) study, a longitudinal investigation of the tran-
sition from adolescence to young adulthood for serious adolescent oﬀenders.6 Participants in the PD
study are adolescents who were found guilty of a serious criminal oﬀense (almost entirely felony oﬀenses)
in the juvenile or adult court systems in Maricopa County, Arizona, or Philadelphia County, Pennsyl-
vania. The study follows 1,354 individuals, who were at least 14 years old and under 18 years old at
the time of their oﬀense. Besides fulﬁlling the requirements of age and criminal activity, individuals
had to provide informed assent or consent to participate in the study.7 Individuals were paid $50 to
participate in the baseline survey, with compensation increasing for the follow-ups to minimize attrition
(Monahan et al., 2009). Twenty percent of the youths approached for participation declined.
The initial (baseline) survey occurred when individuals ﬁrst entered the sample. There were six
semi-annual follow-up interviews, followed by four annual follow-up interviews. In total, the survey
follows each individual for a period of eight years.
One key feature of the PD data is that it follows individuals making school enrollment and crime
decisions over time. This is a crucial feature for understanding the importance of dynamics in decisions
about both crime and education. A second key feature of this dataset is that it contains extremely rich
data on individual characteristics that may be important for predicting both schooling and criminal
activity.
The baseline survey contains basic demographic information including age, gender, ethnicity, and
location (i.e., Maricopa or Philadelphia County). Additionally, the survey records the number of siblings,
the number of children each individual has, whether individuals live with both natural parents (intact
family),8 and whether any family members are involved in criminal activities.9
We also observe whether individuals use drugs, as well as their perceived risk to oﬀending (the
individual-speciﬁc perceived probability of being caught).10 Furthermore, we have a measure of how
much individuals care about the future, though a variable called the Future Outlook Inventory. This
6For more information on the Pathways to Desistance study see Schubert et al. (2004); Mulvey and Schubert (2012).
7Parental consent was obtained for all youth younger than 18 at the time of enrollment in the survey.
8
Dornbush et al. (1985) have shown that family composition during childhood may aﬀect delinquent behavior.
9
Both criminal behavior and enrollment decisions of children can be aﬀected by the criminal involvement of their parents
as the social environment in the family becomes more unstable Geller et al. (2009).
10
Each individual's perceived risk is measured in each period by asking them how likely it is that they will be caught
and arrested for the following seven crimes: ﬁghting, robbery with gun, stabbing someone, breaking into a store or home,
stealing clothes from a store, vandalism, and auto theft. Response options ranged from 0 (no chance) to 10 (absolutely
certain to be caught). We use the average of these seven responses in our empirical analysis.
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measure is created based on survey questions related to the assessment and implications of future
outcomes and consideration of future consequences. Higher scores indicate a greater degree of future
consideration and planning, and thus are associated with higher discount factors (lower discount rates).
Information on family criminal activities, number of children, the perceived risk to oﬀending, drug
use, and future outlook inventory is collected again in each follow-up survey. We complement this with
data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics on local annual unemployment rates, and with annual data on
the number of schools per person from the National Center of Education Statistics, and on the number
of people between the ages of 15 and 19 in each county from the U.S. Census.11
In addition to the detailed information about observable characteristics of each individual, the PD
data also contains the results from a large number of standard psychometric tests that were given to each
person. These tests are designed to measure characteristics of the individual that we typically consider
to be not directly observable, such as intellectual ability (e.g., IQ) and social/emotional capabilities
(e.g., impulse control, self-esteem, and ability to suppress one's aggression). We group these tests into
those designed to measure cognitive skills and those designed to measure social/emotional skills .12
The cognitive measures include the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI) test score,
which produces an estimate of general intellectual ability (IQ) based on two subsets: Vocabulary and
Matrix Reasoning. In addition, we have two batteries of tests related to cognitive dysfunction: the
Stroop Color-Word Test and the Trail-Making Test. The Stroop Color-Word Test is used to examine
the eﬀects of interference on reading ability, and the Trail-Making test is a measure of general brain
function. The Stoop test has three parts, which relate to interference from colors, words, and both
words and colors together. Subjects are asked to identify colors based on the written name of the color,
or the color of the ink the word is printed in. The Trail-Making measures general brain development and
damage. It consists of two parts: Part A involves a series of numbers that the participant is required
to connect in sequential order; Part B involves a series of numbers and letters and the participant is
required to alternately connect letters and numbers in sequential order.13
We also have several measures of social/emotional skills. First, the Weinberger Adjustment In-
ventory (WAI) is an assessment of an individual's social/emotional adjustment within the context of
external constraints. The test is divided into three areas: impulse control, suppression of aggression,
and consideration of others. Second, the Psychosocial Maturity Inventory (PSMI) provides measures of
self-reliance, identity (i.e., self-esteem and consideration of life goals), and work orientation (i.e., pride
11We use the latter two to compute the number of schools per person of high school age in each county-year pair.
12The cognitive tests are given only in the baseline survey, whereas the social/emotional tests are repeated in the
follow-up surveys as well.
13Higher scores indicate disability or impairment.
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in the successful completion of tasks).14
Finally, the dataset contains information on the enrollment and criminal activity decisions of each
individual. In each survey, individuals are asked whether they have been enrolled in school during
the year. In addition, in the baseline survey they are asked what is the highest grade that they have
completed. We combine this variable with subsequent enrollment decisions to construct a measure of
years of accumulated education in each year.
The data on criminal activity comes from self-reporting by each individual. The self-reported oﬀenses
(SRO) consist of 24 components, each of which relates to involvement in a diﬀerent type of crime, e.g.,
destroying or damaging property, setting ﬁres, or selling drugs. For each item, a set of follow-up
questions are triggered that collect more information regarding the reported oﬀense (e.g., "how many
times have you done this in the past N months?") and can be used to identify whether the adolescent
reports committing an act within the recall period, the frequency of these acts, as well as whether the
act was committed alone or with a group. The baseline questionnaire also collects information on the
subject's age at the ﬁrst time he engaged in each criminal activity.
For our analysis we combine these crime components into three categories: (i) violent crime, which
consists of those oﬀenses involving force or threat of force (e.g., robbery and assault), (ii) property
crime, which includes burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson; and (iii) drug-related
crime (e.g., selling marijuana or other drugs). While violent crime typically also includes murder and
rape, these crimes are not reported in our data due to data restrictions, and therefore are not included
in our analysis.15 We also compute results based on one aggregate category, by combining all three
sub-categories.
Although self reported crime may suﬀer from under-reporting, it is the most direct measure of
criminal participation available. It includes all crimes committed by the individual, and not just those for
which the individual was caught. In order to encourage accurate self-reporting, individual responses are
kept conﬁdential, and participants were given a certiﬁcate of conﬁdentiality from the U.S. Department
of Justice. Furthermore, in our analysis we only use information on whether an individual has engaged
in a criminal activity, and not the intensity. This does not require that people truthfully report the
extent of their criminal activities, only that they accurately report criminal participation.
While we have data on the criminal activities of each individual once they enter the survey, we
do not know the criminal history prior to the initial survey, with the exception of knowing the age at
which each individual ﬁrst committed each of the crimes. Since the total years of accumulated crime
14In both the WAI and PSMI tests, higher scores indicate more positive behavior.
15Not all of the components are mapped into one of our three categories, e.g., example drunk driving and carrying a
gun. In total we use 16 of the 24.
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will be an important variable in our model, this generates a missing data problem. For individuals who
ﬁrst committed a crime after the initial survey, we can accurately compute the total years of criminal
experience in each year, since we can infer their entire history of choices. However, some people started
criminal activities as early as age 9. In order to deal with this missing data problem, we impute the
years of crime using the following procedure. We ﬁrst estimate a probit model for crime using the data
on age and the time-invariant covariates (ethnicity, location, gender, intact family, number of siblings)
as regressors. This gives us an estimate of the probability of crime in each period, conditional on age
and time-invariant characteristics. Combined with the age of ﬁrst crime variable, we can then estimate
the expected number of years of crime at the age of the baseline survey. Experience in subsequent years
is then calculated based on this estimate and on the observed crime decisions.16
We construct four panel datasets, one for each of the three crime measures described above and one
with all crime combined together. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for our four samples. There
are a couple of statistics that we want to highlight. First, crime rates in the sample are quite high.
The violent crime rate is 43.5%, 28.5% for property crime, and 21.3% for drug related crime. These
high crime rates (particularly for violent crime) come from the fact that all individuals in the dataset
have been convicted of a serious criminal oﬀense at least once, as this is a requirement for entering
the dataset. About 14% of the sample is female, and there is a large percentage of minorities, with
blacks and Hispanics representing 40% and 34%, respectively. Drug use is also quite prominent, with
an average of 47%. Another interesting observation is that the average age for the ﬁrst crime is 10.7 for
violent, 11.5 for property, and 13.9 for drug-dealing crimes, illustrating that many of these adolescents
start participating in criminal activities well before high school, particularly for violent and property
crime.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the tests designed to measure cognitive and social/emotional
skills. In our empirical analysis we use the two components of IQ separately: the raw WASI Vocabulary
Score and the raw WASI Matrix Reasoning Score. However for interpretability, we report information
on the distribution of IQ scores here as well. On average IQ scores in our sample are substantially
below the average score in the population (100). In fact almost 90% of individuals have a score below
100. For our measures of cognitive impairment, the Trail-Making scores take one of four values, where
the lowest two values indicate either mild/moderate impairment or moderate/severe impairment. In
our sample, 20% have some level of cognitive impairment according to Trail-Making A, and 38% under
16An alternative to this imputation procedure is to, at estimation time, use the probabilities predicted by our model
to integrate the likelihood for each individual starting at age 9 (the earliest age at which any individual started criminal
activities) up until the age of the ﬁrst interview. This substantially increases the computational burden. We tried this
for our baseline speciﬁcation described in Section 4 below, and found that the results were very similar.
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Trail-Making B. The Stroop Tests take a continuum of values, and for each test scores above 40 are
considered normal. For the color, word, and color/word tests respectively, 52%, 36%, and 21% had
scores below normal.
The raw social/emotional test scores, described in Table 3, are a little more diﬃcult to interpret.
In both the WAI and PSMI, individuals are given a set of questions and asked to indicate the extent
to which the statement is true or false (WAI) on a scale of 1-5, or to what extent they either agree or
disagree with the statement (PSMI) on a scale of 1-4. In both tests, responses are coded such that higher
numbers indicate more positive behavior. For the section of the WAI measuring impulse control, 40% of
the scores are below 3, indicating undesirable behavior. For suppression of aggression and consideration
of others, the corresponding percentages are 50% and 18%, With the PSMI, the percentage of scores
consistent with undesirable behavior (scores below 2.5), were considerably smaller: 5% (self reliance),
4% (identity), 15% (work orientation). This suggests that the WAI scores may be more likely to be
related to criminal behavior, which is consistent with our empirical analysis below.
Figures 1-3 illustrate some of the key relationships in the data that our model seeks to explain: in
particular the contemporaneous and dynamic correlations between the education and crime decisions.
Since age is highly correlated with both enrollment and crime decisions, we illustrate all of these
relationships conditioning on age.
Figure 1 shows how the probability of committing crime depends on the lagged crime decision, and
how this evolves with age. Figure 2 shows the same for education. There are two important relationships
to notice. First, both crime and education decisions are highly persistent in that individuals who
committed crime (enrolled in school) in the previous period are much more likely to commit crime
(enroll in school) in the current period. Second, there is some evidence of dynamic selection since, as
individuals age, this relationship becomes even stronger.
Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate strong persistence in crime and education decisions. What cannot
be determined from the ﬁgures alone is the cause of this persistence (Heckman, 1981). This could
be generated by persistent diﬀerences across individuals that are correlated with education and crime
decisions. For example, it may be that low ability youths are less likely to enroll in school and more
likely to commit crimes. A second explanation is that there is state dependence in these decisions. For
example, attending school may be easier if the individual had learned the previous year's material. A
third possibility is that there are returns to previous experience. For example, it may be the case that
individuals become better at committing crimes with more practice, which increases the future prob-
abilities of committing crimes. In our empirical analysis we attempt to disentangle all three potential
causes for the observed persistence in decisions.
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Figure 3 illustrates the contemporaneous link between youth crime and enrollment, suggesting a
negative correlation, particularly in the mid to late teenage years. While this would seem to suggest a
negative eﬀect of enrollment on crime, these results do not control for any heterogeneity (except age)
across individuals, that could also be driving this relationship. In addition, negatively correlated shocks
to the enrollment and crime decisions could also generate this relationship. In the next section we
present our model, and show how we are able to separately identify these confounding eﬀects in order
to recover the causal eﬀect of enrollment on crime.
3 Model
Consider the problem of individuals indexed by i who decide at each age t whether or not to enroll in
school and/or commit crime. The education choice is coded as ei,t = 1 if the person goes to school
in that period and 0 otherwise. The utility associated with the choice ei,t is a function of all relevant
decision variables including years of crime and years of education up to t (Y Ci,t and Y Ei,t), and a set
of individual-speciﬁc characteristics (Zi,t):
Uei,t(ei,t) = Zi,tβ
e
t ei,t + Y Ci,tλ
e





where ξei,t(ci,t) denotes unobservable individual-speciﬁc utility terms. The net utility of getting educa-
tion in period t is:
V ei,t := U
e
i,t(ei,t = 1)− Uei,t(ei,t = 0) = Zi,tβet + Y Ci,tλet + Y Ei,tαet + ηei,t, (2)
where ηei,t = ξ
e
i,t(1)− ξei,t(0). An individual chooses to enroll in school (ei,t = 1) if and only if V ei,t > 0.
Similarly, the crime choice is denoted as ci,t = 1 if a crime is committed and 0 otherwise. The utility
associated with the choice ci,t given the enrollment decision, is deﬁned as:
U ci,t(ci,t) = Zi,tβ
c









The net expected utility of crime commission is:
V ci,t := U
c
i,t(ci,t = 1)− U ci,t(ci,t = 0) = Zi,tβct + Y Ei,tαct + Ei,tγct + Y Ci,tλct + ηci,t (4)
where ηci,t = ξ
c
i,t(1) − ξci,t(0). Given the enrollment decision, the individual chooses to commit crime
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(ci,t = 1) if and only if V
c
i,t > 0.
Notice that in equations (2) and (4) above, we allow contemporaneous enrollment to aﬀect the crime
decision, but not the other way around. The reason for this is that if we were to allow for both types
of feedback eﬀects, the resulting model would not be identiﬁed due to the problem of incoherency.17
Therefore, we impose what is referred to in the literature as the coherency condition, by restricting the
contemporaneous eﬀect of crime on education to be zero.18
Imposing the coherency condition makes our model triangular, which allows us to factor the likeli-
hood in the following way:19
Pr (Ci,t = ci,t, Ei,t = ei,t) = Pr (Ci,t = ci,t | Ei,t = ei,t) Pr (Ei,t = ei,t) ,
where Pr (Ci,t = 1 | Ei,t = ei,t) = Pr
(
V ci,t > 0 | Ei,t = ei,t
)
and Pr (Ei,t = 1) = Pr
(
V ei,t > 0
)
, and simi-
larly for the probabilities of Ci,t = 0 and Ei,t = 0. If we were to assume that the errors in equations
(2) and (4) are independent and normally distributed, we could estimate the model parameters by
estimating separate probits. However, the assumption that the residuals are independent is unlikely
to be true, as many of the factors driving enrollment decisions are likely to drive crime decisions as
well. When this is the case, Ei,t will be endogenous in the crime equation. In order to account for this
possibility we use three strategies. First, we include the number of schools per student (by county and
year), as a measure of the cost of attending school, in the enrollment choice equation but not in the
crime equation. The idea is that a higher concentration of schools per student should make it easier
(less costly) to attend school. By using the number of schools per student as an exclusion restriction,
it can work as a source of exogenous variation that aids for identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of enrollment on
crime.
Second, we factor analyze the residuals by taking advantage of some of the unique features of our
data. As discussed earlier, one key advantage of our data is that it contains measures of both the
cognitive and social/emotional skills of each individual, both of which may be important in driving
both enrollment and crime decisions. Using these test measures, we ﬁrst estimate a correlated factors
model to isolate estimates of cognitive and social/emotional skills (see Section 3.1 for a description of
the factor model we employ).
We then include these measures of skills as regressors in our model, by decomposing the errors in
17See Heckman (1978) and Tamer (2003) for further discussion of the identiﬁcation problems associated with dummy
endogenous variables in simultaneous equations models
18Alternatively we could assume that the contemporaneous eﬀect of enrollment on crime is zero. We chose this as-
sumption because the literature is focused more on the eﬀect of education on crime, as opposed to the eﬀect of crime on
education.
19We keep the conditioning on the remaining variables implicit to ease on notation.
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equations (2) and (4) as follows:
ηei,t = δ









where θ¯cogi and θ¯
emo
i are our estimates of cognitive and social/emotional skills, respectively.
Finally, while we assume that εei,t and ε
c
i,t are i.i.d. across individuals and over time, we allow them to
be correlated with each other. The fact that we are able to observe a wealth of individual characteristics,
which are highly persistent (or ﬁxed) over time, as well as control for unobserved abilities through our
factor estimates, allows us to pull out of the error term components that would otherwise generate
correlation in the errors over time. In particular, we assume that the errors are jointly normally
distributed and estimate the model using a bivariate probit.
The full model that we estimate is then a bivariate probit on Ci,t and Ei,t where
Ci,t =





1 if V ei,t > 0
0 otherwise
,
where the latent variables V ci,t and V
e
i,t are given by
V ci,t = Zi,tβ
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t + Y Ci,tλ
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3.1 Factor Model for Abilities
Let M cogj,i denote one of j = 1, . . . J cognitive measurements. In particular, we use 7 elements of a
battery of tests that were taken by participants in the ﬁrst wave of the survey. There are ﬁve continuous
measures: the WASI matrix reasoning and vocabulary scores, the three Stroop scores (Color, Word and
Color/Word); and two Trail-Making scores which are measured on an ordered discrete scale.
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We also include k = 1, . . .K continuous tests of social/emotional skills that are repeatedly measured
over time, which we denote by M behk,i,t. We employ three WAI scores: Impulse Control, Suppression of
Aggression, and Consideration of Others; as well as three elements of the PSMI: Self Reliance, Identity,
and Work Orientation.
For the case of the continuous measures, we write a linear model


















and we write an ordered model
M cogj,i = 11
(








for the discrete Trail-Making measures. θcogi , θ
emo
i denote cognitive and social/emotional abilities re-
spectively, δcogj , δ
emo











capture other determinants of the test scores like measurement error.
While we assume that θcogi and θ
emo
i are independent of the uniquenesses, we allow them to be corre-
lated with each other.
Identiﬁcation of the factor model follows from the analysis in Carneiro, Hansen, and Heckman
(2003) and Cooley, Navarro, and Takahashi (2015).20 It begins by (conditionally) demeaning the mea-
surements (i.e., recovering the β′s). It then shows that the loadings (i.e., the δ's) are identiﬁed by
taking covariances between diﬀerent cognitive measures and between diﬀerent social/emotional mea-












are non-parametrically identiﬁed from a theorem of Kotlarski (1967) using deconvolution arguments.
The correlation between θcogi and θ
emo
i follows directly from the covariance between cognitive and so-
cial/emotional measures.
The distributions of the unobservables in the measurement systems are non-parametrically identiﬁed.
However, for estimation purposes, we impose distributional assumptions. In particular, we assume that





This normalization implies no restriction since a) we need to pin down the sign of δcog1 for interpretation as having more










































Given these distributional assumptions, the factor model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Let
Mcogj,i = M cogj,i − Zi,1βcogj − θcogi δcogj and Memok,i,t = Memok,i,t − Zi,tβemok,t − θemoi δemok,t . The contribution to
the likelihood of observation i is given by











Φ (θcogi , θemoi ;σ2θ,cog, σ2θ,emo, ρ) dθcogi dθemoi ,
where φ
(|;σ2) is the pdf of a mean zero normal with variance σ2 and Φ (; a, b, c) is the pdf of a bivariate
normal with variances given by a, b and correlation coeﬃcient c.
Having obtained estimates of the parameters of the factor model, we then predict the most likely
values for θcogi , θ
emo
i given the data we observe for each individual i. Prediction follows by applying
Bayes' Rule to recover the distribution of θcogi , θ
emo
i conditional on the data and then using it to obtain
the expected value of θcogi , θ
emo
i over that distribution. That is, we calculate θ¯cogi
θ¯emoi
 = ˆ ˆ
 θcogi
θemoi
 f (θcogi , θemoi |Mi, Zi; βˆ, δˆ, σˆ, ρˆ) dθcogi dθemoi
=








Mi|Zi; βˆ, δˆ, σˆ, ρˆ
) dθcogi dθemoi
which follows directly from our expression for the likelihood.
4 Results
Before getting to the main results from our model, we ﬁrst present the results from our factor analysis
in which we project our measurements of skills onto two factors, one related to cognitive ability, and
one related to social/emotional ability.
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4.1 Factor Analysis
The results from the estimation of the factor model are presented in Tables 4-6 and Figure 4. We chose
the following normalizations. The factor representing cognitive skills is normalized to have a loading of
one in the matrix reasoning WASI test score, while for the factor representing social/emotional skills
the loading is normalized to one on the ﬁrst period WAI Impulse Control measure. Besides being
required for identiﬁcation, these normalizations aid in the interpretation of the factors. Hence, the
factor representing cognitive skills is such that an increase of 1 standard deviation in cognitive skills
leads to an increase of 1 standard deviation on the matrix reasoning WASI test, and similarly for the
social/emotional factor.
In Table 4 we present the estimated distribution of the factors. While we only allow the cognitive
factor to aﬀect cognitive measures and the social/emotional factor to aﬀect social/emotional measures,
we allow the two factors to be correlated. Our estimates show that there is more variance in so-
cial/emotional skills than in cognitive skills, and that they are positively correlated with a correlation
coeﬃcient around 0.23.
In Figure 4 we also present a variance decomposition that allows us to get an idea of how important
it is to account for measurement error (i.e., the uniqueness) when employing these measures. That is,
we decompose the variance of the unobservable component of each measurement into the proportion of
the variance coming from the factor and the proportion contributed by the uniqueness.21 In Tables 5
and 6 we present the estimated parameters of the factor model for the measurement system.
As can be seen from Table 5, having more cognitive ability is related with having better scores in
all of the cognitive measures we use. The negative sign for the Trail-Making scores is consistent with
the way the scores are recorded where a larger score reﬂects cognitive impairment. As Figure 4 shows,
our measure of cognitive skills is more related to the Stroop measures of cognitive dysfunction than to
the WASI-IQ measures. However, even for the Stroop measures, cognitive skills can only explain at
most 62% of the unobserved variance.
As documented in Table 6, for the case of social/emotional scores, more social/emotional skills
lead to higher scores for all the social/emotional measures we include. There is also a general pattern
consistent with maturation eﬀects, in which the mean scores get better over time (i.e., the constant
terms for each period in the equations) and social/emotional ability becomes a stronger determinant of
the scores on the tests (i.e., the loadings). Social/emotional skills explain around 30% of the variance for
all measures, except for the WAI-Consideration of Others where it essentially has no explanatory power.
21In order to avoid having a graph for each of the 8 periods for which we have social/emotional measures, we use the
time-averaged loadings in our calculations.
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What this result suggests is that our measure of social/emotional skills is more related to individual
discipline and control than to attitudes towards other people.
4.2 Baseline Model
We now present the results from our baseline speciﬁcation. In Section 4.3, we consider several alternative
speciﬁcations in order to evaluate the robustness of our results. In our baseline speciﬁcation, in order
to control for unobserved heterogeneity across individuals, we include our estimated cognitive and
social/emotional factor estimates as regressors.22 The results from the baseline bivariate probit are
listed in column 1 of Table 7, where we report the average marginal eﬀects of each covariate. We focus
on the results for overall crime and discuss the results for the separate crime categories only when the
results vary signiﬁcantly by type of crime.23 The results for drug-related, violent, and property crime
separately are found in Tables 8, 9, and 10, respectively.
We ﬁnd that being in Maricopa County (compared to Philadelphia County) is associated with a
higher probability of enrollment in school. The eﬀect of location on crime varies by crime category.
Violent and property crime are higher (2.6 and 5.2%-points respectively) and drug crime is lower (1.8%-
points) in Maricopa County. Blacks are less likely to engage in criminal activities and more likely to
attend school compared to Whites. At the same time, Hispanics are less likely both to commit crime
and to enroll in education than Whites, although the diﬀerences based on ethnicity are small and not
precisely estimated. Females are more likely to attend school (5.8%-points) and less likely to commit
crime (10.2%-points).
Consistent with what one would expect, having a non-intact family, is associated with lower en-
rollment rates and higher crime rates, particularly for drug-related crimes. Age is negatively associated
with enrollment, and both property and violent crime. The result for enrollment is not surprising given
that this dataset covers people between the ages of 14 and 26. The ﬁnding that crime also decreases
with age is consistent with the broader empirical literature on the life-cycle of crime (Farrington, 1986;
Hirschi and Gottfredson, 1983). The fact that drug crime does not seem to decrease with age, combined
with the statistic from Table 1 that shows that people start committing drug crimes at much later
ages, suggests that the age proﬁle for drug crime is diﬀerent compared to violent and property crime
(Sampson and Laub, 2003; Farrington, 1986; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985).
Not surprisingly the eﬀect of the perceived risk of punishment has no eﬀect on education and has
22As a robustness check, in Section 4.3.5 we use the set of measurements which we use to infer the factors, as regressors
directly.
23Note that our results for overall crime should not be interpreted as an average across the crime categories, as the
overall crime category pools all crimes together. However, we ﬁnd that for most of our results, the overall crime estimates
are consistent with the separate crime categories: violent, property, and drug.
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a negative eﬀect on crime. The results are similar across crimes, suggesting fairly strong deterrent
eﬀects of punishment: a 10% increase in the perceived probability of being caught generates a 2.2%-
point decrease in the probability of committing crime.24 Each child an individual has decreases the
probability of enrollment by about 1.6%-points, but has no eﬀect on crime. Having family members
involved in crime has a large positive eﬀect on crime (14.9%-points), with the largest eﬀect for violent
crime, suggesting that the family environment plays an important role in determining criminal behavior.
Perhaps a bit surprisingly, drug use has only a very small negative eﬀect on enrollment decisions (0.2%-
points). It has a large positive eﬀect, however, on overall crime (22.4%-points). The eﬀect on drug-
related crime (21.3%-points) is the highest, but the eﬀects on violent crime (15.9%-points) and property
crime (14.4%-points) are also quite large.
We also include the unemployment rate to control for local employment conditions, and ﬁnd that is
has a positive eﬀect on education: an increase in the unemployment rate by one percentage point leads
to an increased probability of enrollment by 2.1%-points. The eﬀect of unemployment on crime is also
positive but small in magnitude and not statistically signiﬁcant. These results suggest that criminal
youth respond to worsening economic conditions by staying in school, rather than seeking employment
opportunities, but this does not lead to further increases in criminal behavior. Our results are consistent
with those of Betts and McFarland (1995) and Dellas and Sakellaris (2003) who estimate that a 1 percent
increase in the unemployment rate increases enrollment in college by 2 to 4 percent. With regards to
crime, a number of recent studies (e.g., Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001 and Gould, Weinberg, and
Mustard, 2002) ﬁnd a sizable positive eﬀect of unemployment on crime, although Lochner (2004) ﬁnds
that the local unemployment rate has no eﬀect on crime.
We also included a measure called the Future Outlook Inventory, which measures the degree of future
consideration and planning, and proxies for the individual's discount factor. Low discount factors is one
potential cause of criminal activity (Davis, 1988; Akerlund et al., 2014), as people who care less about
the future may be less deterred by the future consequences of their actions. Similarly, high discount
factors are associated with higher investment rates (Chen, 2013; O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1999), such as
investing in education. Our results are consistent with this, as the sign on the eﬀect of Future Outlook
Inventory is negative for crime and positive for education.
As discussed in Section 4.1, higher values of our estimates of cognitive and social/emotional skills are
associated with more positive outcomes. Therefore, we should expect them to be positively associated
with education and negatively associated with crime. We ﬁnd that higher cognitive ability increases the
24These ﬁndings are in line with Lochner (2007), who ﬁnds that a 10% increase in the perceived probability of arrest
reduces criminal participation in major thefts by about 3 percent and in auto theft by more than 8 percent.
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likelihood of enrollment and higher social/emotional skills lead to lower crime rates. The results imply
that a one standard deviation increase in cognitive skills leads to an increased probability of enrollment
of 1.3%-points, and a one standard deviation increase in social/emotional skills leads to a decrease in
the probability of crime of 3.5%-points. The eﬀects of cognitive ability on crime and social/emotional
skills on education are both small and imprecisely estimated.
Initially we expected these eﬀects to be larger (see e.g., Cawley, Heckman, and Vytlacil, 2001;
Heckman, Stixrud, and Urzua, 2006; Murnane, Willett, and Levy, 1995, Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).
However, there are several reasons for why we would ﬁnd more moderate eﬀects. First, we are able to
control for a very rich set of observables, many of which are not commonly available in other datasets.
In the absence of data on these individual characteristics, their eﬀects will be conﬂated with the eﬀects
of skills, biasing estimates of their eﬀects by causing the skill measures to have to explain more of the
variation in enrollment and crime decisions. Second, because the sample consists of serious juvenile
oﬀenders only, the distributions of both types of skills are more compressed relative to the population
at large. As a result, a one standard deviation change is not particularly large.
In addition to controlling for many source of individual heterogeneity, we also allow for previous crime
and education decisions to aﬀect current decisions in two ways. First, we allow the lagged decisions to
aﬀect the current ones.25 This captures state dependence, or inertia, in these decisions. Second, we also
allow the total accumulated experience (measured in years) to aﬀect decisions. The rationale for this
is that human and criminal capital accumulated through previous educational or criminal experience
could aﬀect the returns to both school and crime (Lochner, 2004; Nagin and Paternoster, 1991; Nagin,
Farrington, and Moﬃtt, 1995; Imai, Katayama, and Krishna, 2006; Merlo and Wolpin, 2009).
We ﬁnd strong evidence of state dependence in both the education and crime decisions. Enrolling in
school the previous period increases the probability of enrolling in the current period by 18.8%-points.
Participating in crime in the previous period increases the probability of crime by 15.9%-points. We also
ﬁnd some evidence of returns to experience, although the eﬀects are smaller. The signs of the results
are as expected. An additional year of education is positively associated with enrollment decisions and
negatively associated with crime, but the eﬀects are small and not statistically signiﬁcant. The eﬀect of
criminal experience on crime is positive: an extra year of criminal experience increases the probability
of crime by 2.1%-points. The eﬀect on education is negative, with an extra year of crime associated
with a decrease in the probability of enrollment by 0.7%-points.
25For simplicity, in our baseline model we allow for lagged crime to aﬀect current crime and lagged education to aﬀect
current education, but do not allow for lagged cross-equation eﬀects. We also tried estimating a version allowing for these
eﬀects. The coeﬃcients on these additional terms were small and statistically insigniﬁcant. The other estimates were
virtually unchanged, with the exception of the eﬀect of contemporaneous enrollment on crime, which increased slightly.
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Overall our estimates suggest that there are important dynamics in both the crime and education
decisions. While both matter, the eﬀects of state dependence are much larger that the returns to
experience. This distinction is relevant for policy, as understanding how the pattern of previous decisions
drives current decisions in important for determining how and when to attempt to intervene. We discuss
this more in Section 5 when we illustrate these eﬀects with various policy simulations based on our model
We also examine the eﬀect of contemporaneous education on crime. We ﬁnd that the eﬀect varies by
the type of crime. For property crime, we ﬁnd weak evidence that enrolling in school decreases crime,
with an average marginal eﬀect of 1.8%-points that is not precisely estimated. This is consistent with
the incapacitation eﬀect found by Jacob and Lefgren (2003) and Luallen (2006), although our eﬀect is
much smaller in magnitude. One explanation for this is that our dataset consists of serious oﬀenders
only. It is possible that being in school has stronger incapacitation eﬀects for more minor property
crimes, which are represented proportionally much more in datasets that sample from the population
at large.
For violent and drug-related crime, we ﬁnd the opposite eﬀect: enrollment leads to an increase in
crime rates (10.9%-points for violent and 7.9 for drug-related). This suggests the presence of positive
complementarities between school and drug/violent crime. This is consistent with the concentration
story of Jacob and Lefgren for violent crime, that an increased density of young people leads to more
violent interactions. For drug-related crime, one explanation is that the primary buyers of drugs sold
by juveniles are other juveniles, and thus attending school allows the sellers of drugs to be closer to
their clients.
In order to account for the possibility that education is endogenous, we include the change in the
number of schools per student as an exclusion restriction in the enrollment equation but not in the crime
equation. We ﬁnd that more schools per student is strongly positively related to enrollment, consistent
with the idea that a higher concentration of schools makes it less costly to attend school.
The last row of Table 7 reports the correlation in errors of the crime and enrollment equations. The
estimate of -0.156 indicates that the remaining unobserved drivers of crime and education decisions
are negatively correlated with each other, although the correlation is not precisely estimated. As we
show in the next section, failing to account for this negative correlation leads to a downward bias in
the estimate of the contemporaneous eﬀect of enrollment on crime.
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4.3 Alternative Speciﬁcations
In this section we present results from a number of alternative speciﬁcations to our baseline model. The
ﬁrst set of results is designed to illustrate how our modeling choices aﬀect the estimates. In particular,
we estimate versions of the model in which we incorporate only a limited set of control variables; do
not allow for the crime and education equation errors to be correlated (independent probits instead of
a bivariate probit); do not allow for dynamics; and do not include the number of schools per student
as an exclusion in the enrollment equation.
The objective for the second set of results is to provide some robustness checks to the baseline
model.26 We show that our results are robust to using the direct measures of cognitive and so-
cial/emotional skills, as opposed to our estimates of the underlying skills from the factor model; al-
ternative ways to treat decisions while in jail; alternative deﬁnitions of enrollment; and allowing the
eﬀects of prior crime and education decisions, as well as contemporaneous enrollment, to vary by age.
4.3.1 Controls
A key beneﬁt of our data is that we are able to control for a rich set of observable (criminal involvement
of the family, expected probability of punishment, degree of future consideration, among others) and
typically unobservable (cognitive and social/emotional skills) sources of individual heterogeneity, that
are not commonly available in other datasets. Since most of these variables are highly persistent over
time (or ﬁxed), failing to control for them could lead to estimates of the dynamic eﬀects that are biased
upwards in absolute value. In order to see the possible extent of this bias, we estimate a version of our
model in which we include only a sparse set of individual characteristics (county, gender, and age). The
results are reported in column 2 of Table 7. Consistent with our hypothesis we ﬁnd that the estimated
eﬀects of lagged criminal and educational decisions are inﬂated, particularly their eﬀects on crime. The
returns to criminal experience on crime almost double from 2.1 to 3.9%-points, and the eﬀect of lagged
crime increases by 50% from 15.9 to 23.5%-points. The eﬀects of educational experience on both crime
and enrollment also increase and become statistically signiﬁcant (from -0.4 to -1.4%-points and from
0.6 to 1.1%-points, respectively).
4.3.2 Uncorrelated Errors
In order to determine the importance of allowing the errors in the crime and education decisions to be
correlated, we re-estimate the model using separate probits for the two equations, rather than a bivariate
26We present these results in Tables A1-A4 in the Appendix.
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probit model. The estimated eﬀects are very similar between the two models, with the exception of
the eﬀect of current enrollment on crime, which drops from 9.4 to 2.5%-points. In the bivariate probit
model, the errors are estimated to be negatively correlated with each other. When we assume that they
are independent (and therefore uncorrelated), the model has to decrease the direct eﬀect of current
enrollment on crime to account for this and ﬁt the data, leading to a substantial underestimate of the
causal eﬀect of enrollment on crime.
4.3.3 No Dynamics
The intuition for the eﬀect of not including dynamics in the model is similar to that for not including
covariates. To the extent that there are important dynamic relationships, excluding them from the
model will lead to the magniﬁcation of the eﬀects for the other included variables. In column 4 of Table
7, this is exactly what we see. When we do not allow accumulated experience and lagged decisions
to enter, the eﬀects of the individual heterogeneity increase in absolute value, overstating their true
contribution. For example, the eﬀect of drug use on crime increases from 22.4 to 26.8%-points. The
marginal eﬀect of social/emotional skills also increases in magnitude from -8.1 to -12.4%-points. For
the same reason, this also changes the estimates of the contemporaneous eﬀect of enrollment on crime,
more than doubling the estimated eﬀect from 9.4 to 21.0%-points. This highlights the importance of
controlling for the dynamics in the crime and education decisions. Even when the object of interest is
not dynamic, failing to account for dynamics causes biased estimates of other relationships, including
the contemporaneous eﬀects.
4.3.4 Not Instrumenting
As we discuss above in Section 3, in order to address the potential endogeneity of enrollment in the
crime equation, we introduce an exclusion restriction by adding the number of schools per person in
the enrollment equation. In column 5 we present results in which we do not include this, in order to
illustrate its eﬀect on our estimates. The primary concern was that failing to appropriately control
for endogeneity would lead to a biased estimate of the eﬀect of enrollment on crime, which could in
turn generate bias in the other estimates as well. What we ﬁnd is that by not including this excluded
variable, the estimate of contemporaneous enrollment drops from 9.4 to 7.2%-points. The diﬀerence is
not particularly big, but it is consistent with the expected bias given the negative correlation of the
errors. This result demonstrates that there is some bias that this exclusion restriction is correcting
for. However, the bias is not particularly large, which is likely due to the fact that given the nature
of our data, we are able to control for many sources of observed and unobserved heterogeneity that
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would otherwise generate further correlation in the errors of the crime and enrollment decisions, and
exacerbate the endogeneity problem.
4.3.5 Cognitive and Social/Emotional Skills
We also estimate a speciﬁcation in which we replace our estimates of these skills with the measures used
to infer them. This allows us to investigate whether our results are sensitive to our use of the estimated
cognitive and social/emotional skills, and also to better understand how cognitive and social/emotional
skills contribute to enrollment and crime decisions. As can be seen in column 1 of Table A1 in the
Appendix, the estimates on the other variables are very similar to the baseline estimates, illustrating
that our factor-model-generated measures are eﬀective summaries of these skills.
A somewhat surprising result is that the two measures that generate the IQ score (reasoning and
vocabulary score) have no eﬀect on enrollment decisions. The point estimates are very small and
insigniﬁcant. Given that cognitive ability is viewed as one of the primary drivers of education decisions in
the literature, this is particularly surprising. One explanation for our ﬁnding is that the IQ distribution
in our dataset is shifted to the left, compared to the general population. The average raw IQ score is
only 85 in our data, with only about 10% scoring above the population average of 100. It may be that in
this range of IQ scores, marginal increases in IQ do not have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the value of education
or on the cost of completing education. In contrast, one of the measures of cognitive impairment does
seem to be related to education decisions. The Trail-Making B test, which involves the sequencing of
number and letters is negatively associated with enrollment. So while IQ scores do not seem to be
signiﬁcant drivers of enrollment decisions, there is some evidence that cognitive impairment does. In
particular the Trail-Making B test seems to be the cause of the positive correlation between cognitive
ability and enrollment in the baseline speciﬁcation.
Consistent with the baseline estimates, the tests for cognitive ability are generally uncorrelated with
crime decisions. The sole exception is for property crime, in which there seems to be evidence of positive
returns to cognitive ability.
We have six measures of social/emotional skills. These measures have a consistent negative eﬀect
on crime (most of which are statistically signiﬁcant), with the exceptions of the PSMI-Self-Reliance
measure and in some instances PSMI-Work-Orientation, which have a positive sign. These results are
consistent with the literature, which ﬁnds that a lack of social/emotional skills can be an important
driver of criminal activity. For example, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) suggest that the inability
to exercise self-control (measured as WAI-Impulse Control and WAI-Suppression of Aggression in our
data) in the face of opportunity can explain a major part of all criminal behavior. The fact that self-
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reliance (and sometimes work orientation), which are viewed as positive traits, are associated with a
higher probability of committing crime, suggests that positive social/emotional skills may be beneﬁcial
for both legitimate and illicit activities.
Overall the social/emotional measures have small and insigniﬁcant eﬀects on enrollment, consistent
with our baseline results. However, two components of the PSMI appear to be important for schooling
decisions. PSMI-Identity has a positive eﬀect on enrollment, which makes sense since this measures self-
esteem and consideration of life goals. Somewhat surprisingly, PSMI-Work Orientation has a negative
eﬀect on enrollment.
4.3.6 Modeling Choices while in Jail
In our dataset we can distinguish whether individuals attended a community school only, an institutional
school only, both community and institutional schools, or none. The decision and the incentives to
attend institutional schools when an individual is incarcerated may be diﬀerent from enrolling in a
community-based school when the individual is free. As a result, in our baseline speciﬁcation we drop
observations in which an individual attended only an institutional school in a given year. In order
to determine if our results are sensitive to this , we estimate three other model speciﬁcations under
diﬀerent assumptions about enrollment. In the ﬁrst, we set enrollment to zero if an individual did not
attend a community school (i.e., attended an institutional school only, or attended no school). In the
second speciﬁcation, we add a variable to the model that is an indicator for whether the individual was
incarcerated at the time of the interview, to allow for being in jail to aﬀect the decision of whether to
attend school.27 Finally, we also add the indicator interacted with years of education, years of crime,
and enrollment to allow the eﬀect of previous experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with
whether the individual is in jail. The results of the three speciﬁcations are reported in columns 2, 3
and 4 of Table A1.
In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, the marginal eﬀects for female, punishment, family crime, and drug use
increase in absolute value in the enrollment equation. This is likely to due the fact that these are strong
predictors of crime. When we assume that people who attend only institutional schools decided not to
attend community school (instead of excluding those observations from the likelihood), we are adding
observations in which people are incarcerated and not attending school. Therefore any variables which
27 We also add the jail variable to the crime equation since the crime choice may be diﬀerent when the individual is
incarcerated. For instance, an incarcerated individual may be less able to commit property crimes relative to violent or
drug-related crimes.
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predict that people are more (less) likely to commit crime, will predict that these people are more (less)
likely to be incarcerated, and therefore less (more) likely to enroll in school. This is exactly the pattern
that we see for female, punishment, and family crime.
While drug use is also a strong predictor of crime, the explanation above would cause the eﬀect of
drug use on crime to become more negative (drugs cause more crime, more incarceration, and thus less
school). However, we observe the opposite. The most likely explanation here is that it is more diﬃcult
to use drugs while in jail, so adding these observations (in jail and not attending school) generates a
positive correlation between drug use and enrollment.
The eﬀect of years of education also increases and becomes statistically signiﬁcant, although the
eﬀect is still not that large (2.3%-points). One possible explanation is that people who are incarcerated
have few years of schooling, so by adding these observations (few years of education and not attending
school) we are reinforcing the positive correlation between experience and education choice. We also
observe a small decrease in the eﬀect of contemporaneous enrollment on crime. This is also likely due
to the addition of observations for individuals who were both not attending school and incarcerated
(and therefore likely to have committed a crime in that period).
When we condition on being in jail, the eﬀect of enrollment on crime decreases slightly, but overall
the results are quite similar to those in the baseline. When we interact the dummy for being in jail with
our measures of education and crime, we ﬁnd that our main results are largely unchanged compared
to the speciﬁcation with just the dummy for jail. The only diﬀerence is that we observe some evidence
that the returns to previous educational and crime choices are lower while in jail. The interaction
between jail and lagged enrollment and educational experience in the enrollment equation are negative,
and lagged crime interacted with jail is also negative.
Overall our results with respect to modeling the choices while in jail suggest that our baseline results
are quite robust to alternative modeling decisions. While some of the results related to individual
characteristics are aﬀected in some cases, our main results about the contemporaneous and dynamic
relationships between crime and education are largely unchanged.
4.3.7 Deﬁning Enrollment
In our baseline model we deﬁne someone as enrolled in school if they are currently enrolled in school
at the time of the interview, or if they were enrolled prior to coming to their detention facility. In
order to determine if our results are sensitive to this, we re-estimate the model under an alternative
deﬁnition of enrollment, by deﬁning enrollment as having attended school for at least nine months in
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the previous year. (We also adjust years of education and lagged enrollment accordingly). 28 The
results are reported in column 5 of Table A1. Our main results are largely unchanged.
For some variables, the marginal eﬀects estimated in the baseline shrink towards zero (female, non-
intact family, and cognitive ability), and for a few other variables (age and lagged enrollment), the
magnitude drops considerably. This suggests that these variables are more important in driving the
decision to attend at least some school compared to none at all, than for aﬀecting whether youths attend
school on a regular basis.
For two other variables (drug use and educational experience), the eﬀects are small and insigniﬁcant
in the baseline, and in this speciﬁcation increase in absolute value, and become statistically signiﬁcant.
Together with the baseline results, this suggests that drug use has a small eﬀect on the decision to
enroll in at least some school, but aﬀects the intensive margin of schooling, causing people to attend
less school throughout the year. With educational experience the eﬀect is slightly diﬀerent, since the new
deﬁnition of enrollment not only aﬀects the outcome (contemporaneous enrollment), but also changes
how educational experience is measured. Our results indicate that just attending school for a short
period of time in previous years does not generate an increase in the returns to enrollment, and that
these beneﬁts only accrue if the person attends school for most of the year.
4.3.8 Age-varying Coeﬃcients
One potential concern with our baseline speciﬁcation is that if the eﬀects of previous and contem-
poraneous education and crime decisions vary by age, then any estimated policy eﬀects, particularly
long-run eﬀects, may be biased. In order to examine whether this is the case, and if so to what extent,
we estimate a version of the model in which we allow the eﬀects of accumulated experience, lagged
decisions, and contemporaneous enrollment to vary by the age of the individual. In particular, we
interact these variables with a dummy for whether the person is over 19 years old. In column 6 of
Table A1 we ﬁnd that the estimates vary slightly by age, but the diﬀerences are small. The largest
change is in the eﬀect of lagged enrollment on education, in which the marginal eﬀect decreases from
22.9 to 17.0%-points, suggesting that the state dependence in educational decisions decreases slightly
as individuals age, which is not surprising. Overall, the results seem to be consistent across age.
28We also estimated a version of the model in which we treated enrollment in months as a continuous outcome. We
estimated the system of equations as a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) system, in which the enrollment equation
is a standard linear regression, and the crime equation is a linear probability model. Although the interpretation of the
results is slightly diﬀerent, the results were similar qualitatively to the results for deﬁning the cutoﬀ to be nine months.
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5 Policy Simulations
In this section we disentangle the roles of state dependence (i.e., lagged choices), criminal and human
capital (i.e., accumulated years of crime and education), and heterogeneity both in terms of observ-
ables such as drug use and unobservables such as skills, in driving the interactions between education
and crime. Understanding the importance of each of these determinants is crucial, as the policy rec-
ommendations that are associated with them are quite diﬀerent. For example, if state dependence is
important and criminal activity is very persistent, then preventing someone from committing a crime
at an early age will have important eﬀects on future criminal activity as the persistence will tend to
reduce crime even if nothing else is changed. Furthermore, if being enrolled in school has a large eﬀect
on whether one commits a crime or not, education policies may be an important alternative to other
incapacitation policies like incarceration. If, on the other hand, other determinants of crime, skills for
example, are more important, then one should consider policies that foster these skills (e.g., Heckman,
2000).
For this purpose, we present two types of simulations based on our estimated baseline model.29 In
the ﬁrst case, we try to isolate the importance of dynamics by shocking the individuals with temporary
(i.e., one year) changes, and then tracing the eﬀects that these changes have over a period of 10 years.
In particular, we simulate both the eﬀect of not committing a crime at age 15 and the eﬀect of not
attending school at age 15. We also simulate what happens by preventing someone from consuming
drugs at age 15. In the second set of simulations, we trace the dynamic eﬀects of permanent changes
to diﬀerent variables that measure heterogeneity. In particular, we analyze the eﬀects of increasing
an individual's cognitive and social/emotional skills, as well as the eﬀect of keeping someone from
consuming drugs completely.
5.1 Dynamic Eﬀects of Temporary Changes
We begin by simulating the eﬀects of preventing someone from committing a crime at age 15. Figure
5 shows that this has a very small eﬀect on the probability of enrolling over time. The probability
increases by 1.7%-points after 5 periods (when the median person has a 40% chance of being enrolled),
and then it decreases as a consequence of aging since, after 10 years, almost no one in the data is enrolled
anymore. Figure 5 shows that the eﬀects on crime are much larger than on education. Mechanically the
diﬀerence in the probability of committing a crime between the control and treatment group is one at
implementation. After one year the probability of committing a crime decreases by 20%-points, when
29We focus on the eﬀects on overall crime for the median individual, since they are generally very similar to the eﬀects
on diﬀerent kinds of crime, but we point out when they are diﬀerent.
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the median person has a 70% chance of committing a crime. This eﬀect is almost entirely a consequence
of state dependence (i.e., lagged crime). After that, the eﬀect diminishes over time but, because of the
decrease in criminal experience, it does not disappear. After 10 years, a person who was prevented from
committing a crime at age 15 will still be around 6%-points less likely to commit a crime.
Next, we simulate the eﬀect of having an individual enroll in school at age 15. In Figure 6 we can see
that the eﬀect of education on education is very similar to the eﬀect of crime on crime. Mechanically the
diﬀerence in the probability of being enrolled is one when the policy is implemented. As a consequence
of state dependence, the probability is around 20%-points higher after a year. It decreases over time,
reaching zero after 10 years. Its eﬀect on crime is small but not insigniﬁcant (at least in the ﬁrst years).
Since enrollment has a positive contemporaneous eﬀect on crime, as we can see in Figure 6, it increases
the probability of crime by 8%-points at implementation. The eﬀect rapidly decreases, and it reaches
zero by year 3. After that it becomes slightly negative but very small as more and more human capital
(i.e., years of education) gets accumulated. The eﬀect, however, is not the same for all crimes. For the
case of property crimes, enrollment has an incapacitation eﬀect on crime and hence the eﬀect of one
more year of education at age 15 is to reduce crime by 3%-points as can be seen in Figure 7.
The third simulation we present, the eﬀect of eliminating drug consumption at age 15, is shown in
Figure 8. The eﬀect of a one year reduction in drug consumption on enrollment is negligible. At most
(after ﬁve years) it increases the probability by less than half of one percentage point. Its eﬀect on
crime, on the other hand, is quite large. At implementation, eliminating drug consumption reduces the
probability of committing a crime by almost 25%-points. While the eﬀect decreases rapidly, 10 years
after implementation there is still a 2%-point lower probability of committing a crime associated with
the policy.
Overall, temporary interventions lead to eﬀects that persist somewhat in the short run, and then
decrease towards zero after several years. This is due to the fact that returns to experience are small
relative to the eﬀects of state dependence and individual heterogeneity. While this implies that policies
based on temporary interventions will have only small eﬀects on behavior many years after the policy
(and thus may have to be repeated to continue the eﬀect), the potential gains to such policies are not
insigniﬁcant. Given that crime is highly concentrated among young people, obtaining immediate and
somewhat persistent reductions in crime has the potential to signiﬁcantly aﬀect overall crime rates.
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5.2 Dynamic Eﬀects of Permanent Changes
We next consider the eﬀects that permanent changes to heterogeneity (while holding all other charac-
teristics at their median values) may have on both the enrollment and crime probabilities. We begin
by simulating the case of increasing an individual's cognitive skills from the 25th percentile to the 75th
percentile in the data. While this may sound like a large change, one has to remember that this is for
individuals in our selected data where this distribution is much more compressed than in the overall
population. Such a change is roughly equivalent to increasing a 15 year old's IQ from around 89 to 98
, or moving him from getting a score of 39 to a score of 48 on the Stroop word test, a very modest
increase.30 Figure 9 shows the eﬀect of such a change on enrollment. Not surprisingly, increasing cog-
nitive skills increases the probability of being enrolled but the eﬀect is small. At the most it increases
by 3%-points (after ﬁve years). As shown in Figure 9 increasing cognitive skills essentially has no eﬀect
of the probability of crime and, if anything, it may increase it slightly.
Figure 10 shows the eﬀect of increasing an individual's social/emotional skills from the 25th to the
75th percentile. This change is equivalent to a 1/3 of a standard deviation change in impulse control
for example. As can be seen from the ﬁgures, the eﬀect that this change has on enrollment is negligible.
A diﬀerent story arises when we look at the eﬀect of this change in social/emotional skills on criminal
activity. This change reduces the probability of committing a crime by 3%-points when implemented,
and the eﬀect keeps growing over time. After 10 years the probability of committing a crime is reduced
by 10%-points.
The ﬁnal policy we simulate is shown in Figure 11. In this case we simulate the eﬀects of having
someone not consume drugs permanently. The eﬀects on enrollment look very similar to the case of a
temporary drug consumption change, but the eﬀects are larger. After ﬁve years the policy increases
the probability of enrollment by almost 2.5%-points, a little less than the increase due to a permanent
change in cognitive skills. Its eﬀect on crime is quite large. At implementation it reduces the probability
of crime by almost 25%-points and the eﬀects gets larger over time. After ten years the eﬀect stabilizes
at a reduction of about 45%-points.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that distinguishing between the potential sources of persistence in enrollment
and crime decisions is important both in terms of generating a better understanding of what drives
30In order for one Word T-score score to be considered "higher" or "lower" than another, a 10 point or greater T score
diﬀerence is required.
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behavior, and for the purpose of designing policy. We ﬁnd that individual heterogeneity is strongly
related to criminal behavior. Many of these dimensions of heterogeneity go beyond what is typically
measured in most datasets, such as attitudes about the future (future outlook inventory), drug use,
family crime, and social/emotional skills. This illustrates the importance of controlling for a rich set of
individual characteristics. Our results also help to identify which particular sources are most relevant
for driving behavior. We ﬁnd that family crime, drug use, and social/emotional skills are important
drivers of criminal behavior.
In our policy simulations we illustrate the eﬀect of individual heterogeneity on crime through policies
targeting drug consumption, as the estimates of their direct eﬀect are large. However, variables such
as the probability of apprehension, future outlook, or social/emotional skills may be easier to aﬀect.
Such interventions would have similar eﬀects as they all enter into the model in the same way, but
with diﬀerent magnitudes depending on the size of the policy change and the characteristics that were
targeted.
We ﬁnd, perhaps unsurprisingly, that policies designed to generate permanent or long-run changes,
such as keeping a youth oﬀ of drugs entirely, generate the largest eﬀects. However, policies with
temporary changes to individual behavior, such as one-time reductions in drugs use, or keeping people
out of crime for one period, can also have lasting eﬀects. For example, a policy that prevents someone
from committing a crime in a given year generates an eﬀect on crime in the following year (-18%-
points) that is comparable to the ﬁrst year eﬀect of permanently preventing drug use (-23%-points).
This implies that there is room for policies designed to shock individuals out of current bad decisions,
and thus break the persistence caused by this state dependence. To the extent that these types of
policies are easier to implement (by incarceration for example) than permanent changes to individuals,
their eﬀect should not be dismissed. The reductions obtained are considerable and, at least in the case
we model here, they are obtained during the ages in which criminal activities are at their peak.
Our estimated eﬀects of returns to criminal and education experience are precisely estimated, but not
particularly large in magnitude. This implies that the observed persistence in choices comes not from
this channel, but via state dependence and individual heterogeneity instead. This has important policy
implications as well. If returns to criminal experience were high, then individuals who had accumulated
a lot of experience might be very diﬃcult to deter from committing crimes in the future. But since we
ﬁnd these returns to be low, this suggests that there does not come a point at which it is too late to
intervene. Even youth who have amassed a long history of bad decisions can be aﬀected by temporary
interventions to break the state dependence and through changes to individual heterogeneity, such as
reducing drug use or improving social/emotional skills.
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Finally, it is important to stress that we are studying youth who have already committed somewhat
serious criminal oﬀenses. We feel that this is a particularly relevant group to study, as they represent
a large proportion of youth crime, particularly serious crime. Furthermore, this is a group that has
been studied relatively less intensively in the literature, largely due to data constraints. However, one
implication of this is that our results do not necessarily generalize to the population at large. The
factors that cause these serious oﬀenders to reduce crime, may not be the same as those that prevent
people from committing their ﬁrst crime. Additionally, what helps to reduce serious crimes such as
robbery and assault, may not be as useful for preventing less serious crimes such as shoplifting.
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Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Age First Crime 13.887 1.678 10.747 1.998 11.507 2.205 10.429 1.805
Age First Interview 16.026 1.141 16.029 1.141 16.030 1.140 16.029 1.141
Phoenix 0.499 0.500 0.492 0.500 0.491 0.500 0.493 0.500
Hispanic 0.342 0.475 0.339 0.474 0.339 0.474 0.340 0.474
Black 0.398 0.490 0.402 0.490 0.401 0.490 0.401 0.490
Other 0.047 0.212 0.048 0.214 0.048 0.214 0.048 0.214
Female 0.140 0.348 0.142 0.349 0.142 0.349 0.142 0.350
Siblings 4.085 2.410 4.093 2.413 4.090 2.409 4.094 2.413
Non-Intact Family 0.854 0.353 0.854 0.353 0.854 0.353 0.854 0.353
Children 0.438 0.807 0.447 0.817 0.447 0.817 0.445 0.815
Family Crime 0.195 0.396 0.193 0.395 0.193 0.394 0.195 0.396
Certainty of Punishment 5.586 2.327 5.578 2.322 5.575 2.325 5.578 2.320
Drug use 0.466 0.499 0.473 0.499 0.473 0.499 0.472 0.499
Local Unemployment Rate 5.783 1.557 5.811 1.554 5.817 1.551 5.804 1.555
Future of Outlook Inventory 2.592 0.544 2.591 0.543 2.593 0.544 2.592 0.542
Crime Rate 0.213 0.410 0.435 0.496 0.285 0.451 0.538 0.499
Enrollment Rate 0.541 0.498 0.539 0.499 0.539 0.498 0.540 0.498
Years of Education 11.102 1.968 11.122 1.965 11.117 1.966 11.116 1.967
Age 19.073 2.530 19.089 2.530 19.084 2.529 19.084 2.532
Sample Size
Notes:
2. The sample size varies across the four samples since they differ in the number of missing values in self-reported crime.
Table 1: Pathways to Desistance Descriptive Statistics:
Mean and Standard Deviation By Sample
1. The descriptive statistics reported in this table correspond to data from the combined baseline and follow-up surveys.
All CrimeVariable Drug-Related Crime Violent Crime Property Crime




1% 55 20 20
5% 62 20 20
10% 67 24 23
25% 76 30 35
50% 85 38 44
75% 94 43 51
90% 102 51 55
95% 106 53 57





Mild / Moderately Impaired 13.56




Mild / Moderately Impaired 26.37
Moderately / Severely Impaired 11.63
% Score < 40
Color 52.06
Word 36.31
Color - Word 20.89
Table 2: Pathways to Desistance Descriptive Statistics:
Measures of Cognitive Skills
4. The Stroop Color-Word Test is used to examine the effects of interference on reading ability. The test has three parts, 
which relate to interference from words, colors, and both words and colors.  The Tests take a continuum of values, and for 
each test scores above 40 are considered “normal”.






1. The descriptive statistics are based on the overall crime sample.
3. The Trail-Making test is a measure of general brain function. Part A involves a series of numbers and the participant is 
required to connect the numbers in sequential order; Part B involves a series of numbers and letters and the participant is 
required to alternately connect letters and numbers in sequential order. The  scores take one of four values, where the 
lowest two values indicate either mild/moderate impairment or moderate/severe impairment. 
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WAI
% Score < 3
Impulse Control 40.3
Suppression of Aggression 50.3
Consideration of Others 17.8
PSMI
%  Score < 2.5
Consideration of Others 5.4
Identity 4.2
Work Orientation 15.3
Table 3: Pathways to Desistance Descriptive 
Statistics:
Measures of Social/Emotional Skills
2. The WAI is an assessment of an individual's social/emotional adjustment within the 
context of external constraints. The test is divided into three areas: impulse control, 
suppression of aggression, and consideration of others.  Individuals are given a set of 
questions and asked to indicate to extext the statment is true or false  on a scale of 1-5. 
Responses are coded such that higher numbers indicate more positive behavior. Scores 
below 3 indicate undesirable behavior. 
3. The PSMI provides measures of self-reliance, identity (i.e., self-esteem, and 
consideration of life goals), and work orientation (i.e., pride in the successful completion 
of tasks). Individuals are given a set of questions and asked to what extent they either 
agree or disagree with the statement on a scale of 1-4. Responses are coded such that 
higher numbers indicate more positive behavior. Scores below 2.5 indicate undesirable 
behavior.
Notes:
1. The descriptive statistics are based on the overall crime sample.
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Estimate
Variance of Cognitive Skills 0.1138
Variance of Social/Emotional Skills 0.1875
Correlation Coefficient 0.2275
Table 4: Distribution of Skills
Notes:
We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional 
measures. The table presents the estimates for the distribution of the 
factors, what we call cognitive and social/emotional skills, which are 
assumed to follow a bivariate normal distribution.
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Matrix Vocabulary Color Word Color/Word A B
Constant -0.1332 0.7407 -0.4474 -1.3592 -0.9075 - -
Age 0.0100 -0.0590 0.0763 0.1195 0.1285 -0.1345 -0.1031
Hispanic -0.3704 -0.6158 -0.2352 -0.2763 -0.2721 0.3139 0.4108
Black -0.6516 -0.7763 -0.4371 -0.2428 -0.4811 0.7512 0.6749
Other -0.2577 -0.4707 -0.2360 -0.3750 -0.4350 0.2536 0.3020
Female -0.0285 -0.0091 0.1863 0.1059 0.0674 -0.1405 -0.2419
Siblings -0.0204 -0.0358 -0.0278 -0.0240 -0.0338 -0.0159 0.0072
Future Outlook -0.0829 0.0286 0.0287 -0.0174 -0.0151 0.0666 0.1685
Years of Education 0.0709 0.0884 -0.0563 -0.0273 -0.0782 -0.1009 -0.0992
Cognitive Ability 1.0000 1.2244 2.0893 2.2756 1.8505 -1.3106 -1.8063
Variance 0.8235 0.7026 0.4723 0.3823 0.5466 1.0000 1.0000
Cutoff 1 - - - - - -2.8288 -2.2188
Cutoff 2 - - - - - -1.6384 -1.3634
Cutoff 3 - - - - - -0.8936 -0.2749
We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. The table presents the parameter estimates for the 
cognitive measure system. The components of WASI and Stroop are modeled using a linear in parameters specification of the 
form:                                                     where j indexes the measure (column in the table) and i the individual. For the case of Trail-
Making we use an ordered model of the form 




M j ,icog = Ziβ jcog +θicogδ jcog + ξ j ,icog ,
M j ,icog = 1 ψ l < Ziβ jcog +θicogδ jcog + ξ j ,icog ≤ψ l+1( ).
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Impulse Control Suppression of Aggression
Consideration of 
Others Self Reliance Identity Work Orientation
Period 1 -1.4934 -0.7074 -2.1671 -0.6365 -0.4860 -1.2707
Period 2 -1.3404 -0.6757 -2.2684 -0.5820 -0.4492 -1.1539
Period 3 -1.3854 -0.6833 -2.2467 -0.5474 -0.4385 -1.0395
Period 4 -1.3167 -0.6552 -2.2110 -0.4452 -0.3722 -0.9717
Period 5 -1.2565 -0.5854 -2.1219 -0.3709 -0.3413 -0.8584
Period 6 -1.2444 -0.5408 -2.0583 -0.2982 -0.2552 -0.8071
Period 7 -1.2029 -0.4875 -2.0495 -0.2450 -0.1866 -0.7470
Period 8 -1.1600 -0.4904 -2.0804 -0.2869 -0.2937 -0.8330
Age in Period 1 0.0136 -0.0151 0.0142 -0.0160 -0.0297 -0.0164
Hispanic 0.1339 -0.1075 -0.0433 -0.3039 -0.2933 -0.1851
Black 0.4635 -0.1845 -0.0178 0.1078 0.0484 0.0015
Other 0.2403 -0.0446 -0.0037 -0.1886 -0.1517 -0.1072
Female 0.2133 0.1574 0.1784 0.1661 -0.0030 -0.0585
Siblings -0.0121 -0.0042 0.0081 -0.0106 -0.0183 -0.0025
FOI 0.3107 0.2240 0.7484 0.1629 0.2449 0.3742
Years of Education 0.0048 0.0328 -0.0041 0.0313 0.0311 0.0311
Period 1 1.0000 0.9197 0.2343 1.2809 1.3246 1.2627
Period 2 1.0324 0.9066 0.0950 1.3371 1.2880 1.2813
Period 3 1.1184 1.0251 0.0797 1.3088 1.3425 1.2839
Period 4 1.2610 1.1306 0.1033 1.2888 1.3373 1.2863
Period 5 1.2910 1.1186 0.0628 1.3655 1.4156 1.3289
Period 6 1.2720 1.1006 0.0629 1.3484 1.4266 1.4234
Period 7 1.3725 1.1542 0.0996 1.3421 1.3833 1.4001
Period 8 1.2565 1.1108 0.0684 1.1588 1.1932 1.1238
Variance 0.6044 0.7244 0.8050 0.5767 0.5655 0.5194
We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. The table presents the parameter estimates for the social/emotional measure system. We use a 
linear in parameters specification of the form:                                                              where k indexes the measure (column in the table), i the individual and t time.







Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0446** 0.0308 0.0381** 0.0301* 0.0451** 0.0385** 0.0470** 0.0325 0.0912*** 0.0334*
(0.0211) (0.0198) (0.0187) (0.0182) (0.0211) (0.0192) (0.0215) (0.0208) (0.0184) (0.0199)
Hispanic -0.0244* -0.0211 -0.0248* -0.0232 -0.0253* -0.0342** -0.0258* -0.0218
(0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0151) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0155)
Black 0.0222 -0.0353* 0.0217 -0.0340* 0.0397** -0.0553*** 0.0220 -0.0349*
(0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0182)
Other 0.0342 -0.0246 0.0340 -0.0227 0.0385 -0.0361 0.0356 -0.0240
(0.0270) (0.0301) (0.0270) (0.0302) (0.0280) (0.0303) (0.0270) (0.0302)
Female 0.0577*** -0.1020*** 0.0540*** -0.0873*** 0.0574*** -0.0995*** 0.0699*** -0.1690*** 0.0570*** -0.1020***
(0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0147) (0.0162) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0148) (0.0162)
Non-intact Family -0.0500*** 0.0308* -0.0504*** 0.0274* -0.0519*** 0.0406** -0.0509*** 0.0297*
(0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0157) (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.0158)
Siblings -0.0020 0.0040 -0.0018 0.0039 -0.0037 0.0063** -0.0021 0.0040
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Age -0.0798*** -0.0253*** -0.0833*** -0.0347*** -0.0800*** -0.0345*** -0.104*** -0.0142 -0.0819*** -0.0283***
(0.0040) (0.0074) (0.0037) (0.0083) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0020) (0.0087) (0.0040) (0.0077)
Punish 0.0029 -0.0221*** 0.0029 -0.0220*** 0.0049* -0.0279*** 0.0028 -0.0221***
(0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Children -0.0177** 0.0079 -0.0174** 0.0067 -0.0318*** 0.0141* -0.0173** 0.0075
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0076) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Family Crime 0.0023 0.1490*** 0.0020 0.1500*** -0.0019 0.1760*** 0.0038 0.150***
(0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0146) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.0152)
Drug Use -0.0022 0.2240*** -0.0020 0.2250*** -0.0114 0.2680*** -0.0013 0.2250***
(0.0116) (0.0104) (0.0116) (0.0103) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0116) (0.0104)
Unemployment Rate 0.0208*** 0.0103* 0.0212*** 0.0103* 0.0211*** 0.0138*** 0.0226*** 0.0088 0.0370*** 0.0115**
(0.0059) (0.0054) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0049) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0055)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0189* -0.0243** 0.0190* -0.0235** 0.0252** -0.0313*** 0.0167 -0.0241**
(0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.0115)
Years of Crime -0.0069*** 0.0205*** -0.0071*** 0.0385*** -0.0069*** 0.0201*** -0.0072*** 0.0204***
(0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028)
Lagged Crime 0.1590*** 0.2350*** 0.1610*** 0.1600***
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0124)
Years of Education 0.0065 -0.0043 0.0114*** -0.0135*** 0.0066 -0.0025 0.0057 -0.0038
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0045) (0.0042) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0042)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1880*** 0.1910*** 0.1890*** 0.1890***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Enrollment 0.0943* 0.0829 0.0248* 0.2100*** 0.0716
(0.0484) (0.0535) (0.0142) (0.0612) (0.0507)
Change in Schools per Young Person 322.2000*** 323.4000*** 311.6000*** 319.8000***
(71.3200) (71.6300) (71.3100) (72.2100)
Cognitive Factor 0.0395** 0.0117 0.0409** 0.0150 0.0474** 0.0238 0.0393** 0.0128
(0.0190) (0.0197) (0.0189) (0.0196) (0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0190) (0.0197)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0026 -0.0805*** 0.0023 -0.0805*** 0.0124 -0.1240*** 0.0035 -0.0806***
(0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0149) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0149)
Rho





4. In Column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In Column (3) the errors in 
the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in Column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of experience and 





3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Change in Schools per Young Person) except for the last specification (5).
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho accounts for the correlation in errors.
-­‐0.3970***
Table 7: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education 
(Overall Crime)
(1) (2)








Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0401* -0.0182 0.0355* -0.0174 0.0408* -0.0102 0.0402* -0.0112 0.0874*** -0.0165
(0.0212) (0.0153) (0.0189) (0.0143) (0.0213) (0.0149) (0.0217) (0.0159) (0.0185) (0.0153)
Hispanic -0.0241* -0.0223* -0.0224 -0.0242** -0.0292* -0.0287** -0.0250* -0.0227*
(0.0146) (0.0117) (0.0146) (0.0117) (0.0151) (0.0122) (0.0147) (0.0117)
Black 0.0231 -0.0090 0.0235 -0.0066 0.0418** -0.0257* 0.0231 -0.0086
(0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0174) (0.0140) (0.0178) (0.0146) (0.0174) (0.0140)
Other 0.0337 -0.0147 0.0354 -0.0113 0.0390 -0.0222 0.0354 -0.0142
(0.0275) (0.0245) (0.0275) (0.0245) (0.0286) (0.0251) (0.0275) (0.0245)
Female 0.0598*** -0.1030*** 0.0557*** -0.0985*** 0.0591*** -0.1010*** 0.0665*** -0.1420*** 0.0594*** -0.1030***
(0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0140) (0.0153) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0143)
Non-intact Family -0.0528*** 0.0329*** -0.0531*** 0.0290** -0.0552*** 0.0375*** -0.0536*** 0.0321**
(0.0148) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0126) (0.0154) (0.0131) (0.0149) (0.0127)
Siblings -0.0022 0.0000 -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0037 0.0016 -0.0024 0.0000
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0019)
Age -0.0810*** 0.0007 -0.0840*** -0.0089 -0.0811*** -0.0094*** -0.1040*** 0.0097* -0.0831*** -0.0011
(0.0039) (0.0053) (0.0037) (0.0057) (0.0039) (0.0032) (0.0020) (0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0056)
Punish 0.0034 -0.0103*** 0.0036 -0.0100*** 0.0056** -0.0148*** 0.0033 -0.0103***
(0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0026) (0.0021)
Children -0.0162** 0.0084 -0.0161** 0.0072 -0.0329*** 0.0189*** -0.0158** 0.0082
(0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0058)
Family Crime 0.0007 0.0842*** 0.0009 0.0851*** -0.0053 0.1070*** 0.0026 0.0844***
(0.0148) (0.0100) (0.0148) (0.0100) (0.0153) (0.0105) (0.0148) (0.0100)
Drug Use 0.0048 0.2130*** 0.0042 0.2150*** -0.0070 0.2560*** 0.0056 0.2140***
(0.0119) (0.0095) (0.0119) (0.0096) (0.0119) (0.0092) (0.0119) (0.0096)
Unemployment Rate 0.0202*** 0.0018 0.0207*** 0.0024 0.0207*** 0.0056 0.0224*** 0.0011 0.0367*** 0.0025
(0.0060) (0.0044) (0.0060) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0040) (0.0061) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0044)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0182 -0.0082 0.0191* -0.0068 0.0227** -0.0097 0.0163 -0.0079
(0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0089) (0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0111) (0.0089)
Years of Crime -0.0110*** 0.0218*** -0.0119*** 0.0403*** -0.0107*** 0.0212*** -0.0113*** 0.0217***
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0029)
Lagged Crime 0.0976*** 0.1490*** 0.0984*** 0.0980***
(0.0102) (0.0113) (0.0103) (0.0102)
Years of Education 0.0067 -0.0085*** 0.0113*** -0.0115*** 0.0067 -0.0065** 0.0058 -0.0082**
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0043) (0.0033)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1900*** 0.1940*** 0.1910*** 0.1910***
(0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125) (0.0125)
Enrollment 0.0785** 0.0634* 0.0001 0.1550*** 0.0637*
(0.0353) (0.0376) (0.0111) (0.0381) (0.0376)
Change in Schools per Young Person 325.5000*** 324.3000*** 310.7000*** 322.1000***
(71.6600) (72.0600) (72.0600) (72.7600)
Cognitive Factor 0.0500*** 0.0138 0.0495** 0.0182 0.0642*** 0.0203 0.0495** 0.0146
(0.0192) (0.0151) (0.0192) (0.0150) (0.0199) (0.0158) (0.0193) (0.0151)
Social/Emotional Factor  0.0018 -0.0257** 0.0018 -0.0255** 0.0058 -0.0410*** 0.0030 -0.0257**
(0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0141) (0.0116) (0.0146) (0.0120) (0.0142) (0.0116)
Rho
Observations 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074 5,074
4. In Column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In Column (3) the errors in 
the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in Column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of experience and 
state dependence). The last specification (5) does not include the exclusion restriction.
(0.1360)
Notes:
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho accounts for the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Change in Schools per Young Person) except for the last specification (5).





Table 8: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education 
(Drug-Related Crime)




Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0390* 0.0263 0.0321* 0.0360** 0.0395* 0.0346* 0.0435** 0.0156 0.0868*** 0.0287
(0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0186) (0.0181) (0.0211) (0.0195) (0.0216) (0.0208) (0.0184) (0.0202)
Hispanic -0.0220 -0.0193 -0.0229 -0.0218 -0.0260* -0.0225 -0.0235 -0.0201
(0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0152) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0155)
Black 0.0246 -0.0373** 0.0240 -0.0358* 0.0404** -0.0499*** 0.0245 -0.0370**
(0.0172) (0.0182) (0.0172) (0.0183) (0.0177) (0.0184) (0.0173) (0.0182)
Other 0.0381 -0.0147 0.0368 -0.0124 0.0405 -0.0115 0.0393 -0.0141
(0.0271) (0.0302) (0.0270) (0.0304) (0.0282) (0.0302) (0.0271) (0.0303)
Female 0.0559*** -0.0801*** 0.0519*** -0.0711*** 0.0556*** -0.0773*** 0.0695*** -0.149*** 0.0550*** -0.0794***
(0.0147) (0.0168) (0.0144) (0.0172) (0.0147) (0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0148) (0.0169)
Non-intact Family -0.0477*** 0.0137 -0.0476*** 0.0102 -0.0511*** 0.0209 -0.0485*** 0.0128
(0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0158) (0.0151) (0.0161) (0.0146) (0.0159)
Siblings -0.0024 0.00412 -0.00232 0.00397 -0.00383 0.00644** -0.00259 0.00408
(0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Age -0.0806*** -0.0272*** -0.0839*** -0.0319*** -0.0805*** -0.0373*** -0.1040*** -0.0165* -0.0826*** -0.0300***
(0.0039) (0.0074) (0.0036) (0.0080) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0020) (0.0085) (0.0039) (0.0077)
Punish 0.0032 -0.0195*** 0.0032 -0.0193*** 0.0051** -0.0239*** 0.0031 -0.0194***
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027)
Children -0.0174** 0.00806 -0.0172** 0.00674 -0.0319*** 0.0109 -0.0171** 0.0077
(0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0073) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0075)
Family Crime 0.0045 0.1300*** 0.0046 0.1320*** -0.001 0.1550*** 0.0065 0.1310***
(0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0146) (0.0145)
Drug Use -0.0055 0.1590*** -0.0054 0.1600*** -0.0147 0.1910*** -0.0048 0.1600***
(0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0114) (0.0111) (0.0117) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0111)
Unemployment Rate 0.0207*** 0.0046 0.0210*** 0.0039 0.0210*** 0.0085* 0.0224*** 0.0035 0.0374*** 0.0057
(0.0059) (0.0056) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0051) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0056)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0184* -0.0249** 0.0177 -0.0240** 0.0258** -0.0290** 0.0160 -0.0247**
(0.0109) (0.0115) (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0116)
Years of Crime -0.0070*** 0.0210*** -0.0075*** 0.0331*** -0.0069*** 0.0205*** -0.0073*** 0.0209***
(0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0022) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0026)
Lagged Crime 0.1430*** 0.1880*** 0.1450*** 0.1440***
(0.0123) (0.0127) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Years of Education 0.0067 -0.0005 0.0118*** -0.0097** 0.0066 0.0015 0.0058 0.0000
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0042) (0.0043)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1890*** 0.1910*** 0.1900*** 0.1900***
(0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Enrollment 0.1090** 0.1010** 0.0335** 0.2040*** 0.0881*
(0.0477) (0.0511) (0.0142) (0.0593) (0.0504)
Change in Schools per Young Person 331.5000*** 334.1000*** 320.8000*** 326.3000***
(71.1300) (71.4100) (71.1800) (72.4000)
Cognitive Factor 0.0453** 0.0225 0.0469** 0.0268 0.0531*** 0.0407** 0.0452** 0.0237
(0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0195) (0.0203) (0.0190) (0.0199)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0024 -0.0727*** 0.0030 -0.0728*** 0.0105 -0.1100*** 0.0037 -0.0728***
(0.0141) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0144) (0.0149) (0.0141) (0.0149)
Rho
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232
-0.1680 -0.1570 -0.3620*** -0.1200
(0.1080)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho accounts for the correlation in errors.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Change in Schools per Young Person) except for the last specification (5).
4. In Column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In Column (3) the errors in 
the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in Column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of experience and 
state dependence). The last specification (5) does not include the exclusion restriction.
(0.1040) (0.1020) (0.1350)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Table 9: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education 
(Violent Crime)
Baseline Controls Uncorrelated Errors No Dynamics Not Instrumenting
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VARIABLES
Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0495** 0.0521*** 0.0463** 0.0289* 0.0493** 0.0502*** 0.0471** 0.106*** 0.0973*** 0.0536***
(0.0212) (0.0172) (0.0189) (0.0156) (0.0212) (0.0165) (0.0217) (0.0187) (0.0185) (0.0172)
Hispanic -0.0233 -0.0135 -0.0232 -0.0131 -0.0264* -0.0384*** -0.0246* -0.0139
(0.0147) (0.0126) (0.0147) (0.0125) (0.0151) (0.0133) (0.0147) (0.0126)
Black 0.0217 -0.0103 0.0217 -0.0106 0.0409** -0.0401** 0.0216 -0.0099
(0.0173) (0.0153) (0.0173) (0.0153) (0.0176) (0.0162) (0.0173) (0.0153)
Other 0.0352 0.0156 0.0353 0.0151 0.0402 -0.0061 0.0362 0.0162
(0.0272) (0.0248) (0.0272) (0.0247) (0.0283) (0.0262) (0.0272) (0.0248)
Female 0.0661*** -0.0256* 0.0624*** -0.0285** 0.0662*** -0.0265* 0.0693*** -0.0589*** 0.0659*** -0.0248*
(0.0142) (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0138) (0.0145) (0.0152) (0.0142) (0.0140)
Non-intact Family -0.0475*** 0.007 -0.0474*** 0.0078 -0.0495*** 0.00844 -0.0484*** 0.0064
(0.0146) (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0130) (0.0152) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0132)
Siblings -0.0029 0.0024 -0.0029 0.0025 -0.0040 0.0030 -0.0031 0.0024
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0021)
Age -0.0823*** -0.0249*** -0.0856*** -0.0296*** -0.0822*** -0.0228*** -0.104*** -0.0252*** -0.0846*** -0.0266***
(0.0038) (0.0063) (0.0036) (0.0065) (0.0038) (0.0035) (0.0020) (0.0093) (0.0038) (0.0065)
Punish 0.0036 -0.0157*** 0.0036 -0.0158*** 0.0054** -0.0220*** 0.0035 -0.0157***
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023)
Children -0.0174** 0.0007 -0.0176** 0.0010 -0.0323*** 0.0036 -0.0170** 0.0004
(0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0066)
Family Crime 0.0013 0.0954*** 0.0013 0.0952*** -0.0015 0.1240*** 0.0032 0.0955***
(0.0146) (0.011) (0.0146) (0.0112) (0.0152) (0.0117) (0.0147) (0.0112)
Drug Use -0.0075 0.1440*** -0.0073 0.1440*** -0.0138 0.1830*** -0.0069 0.1440***
(0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0114) (0.0094) (0.0118) (0.0097) (0.0115) (0.0094)
Unemployment Rate 0.0214*** 0.0093* 0.0217*** 0.0083* 0.0213*** 0.0086** 0.0236*** 0.0119** 0.0378*** 0.0101**
(0.0059) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0050) (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0176 -0.0330*** 0.0175 -0.0333*** 0.0240** -0.0422*** 0.0155 -0.0328***
(0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0109) (0.0098) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0109) (0.0098)
Years of Crime -0.0034 0.0184*** -0.0042* 0.0300*** -0.0034 0.0184*** -0.0036 0.0184***
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0023)
Lagged Crime 0.1450*** 0.1960*** 0.1450*** 0.1450***
(0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0102)
Years of Education 0.0072* 0.0045 0.0124*** -0.0008 0.0071* 0.0041 0.0065 0.0049
(0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0035) (0.0042) (0.0037)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1900*** 0.1920*** 0.1900*** 0.1900***
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123) (0.0123)
Enrollment -0.0176 -0.0193 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0307
(0.0402) (0.0414) (0.0119) (0.0746) (0.0418)
Change in Schools per Young Person 326.6000*** 327.6000*** 328.5000*** 309.5000***
(71.3900) (71.6000) (71.2300) (74.1400)
Cognitive Factor 0.0429** 0.0170 0.0426** 0.0163 0.0562*** 0.0395** 0.0426** 0.0176
(0.0189) (0.0166) (0.0189) (0.0165) (0.0196) (0.0177) (0.0190) (0.0166)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0020 -0.0660*** 0.0021 -0.0661*** 0.0091 -0.126*** 0.0031 -0.0659***
(0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0143) (0.0129) (0.0145) (0.0130) (0.0144) (0.0129)
Rho 0.0459 0.0143 0.0022 0.0855
(0.1170) (0.1070) (0.1950) (0.1220)
Observations 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232 5,232
2. The errors in the enrollment and crime equations are allowed to be correlated in every specification, expect for specification (3). Rho accounts for the correlation in errors.
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
3. Every specification includes an exclusion restriction that enters the education equation only (Change in Schools per Young Person) except for the last specification (5).
4. In Column (2) we exclude the cognitive and social/emotional factors and control for just a few variables (location, gender, age, and local unemployment rate). In Column (3) the errors in 
the enrollment and crime equations are uncorrelated. The specification in Column (4) does not account for any dynamics in the crime and education equation (years of experience and 
state dependence). The last specification (5) does not include the exclusion restriction.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Table 10: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education 
(Property Crime)
Baseline Controls Uncorrelated Errors No Dynamics Not Instrumenting
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3. The box above each figure indicates age.
Figure 1: Probability of Crime by Lagged Crime Choice and Age
Notes:
2. The horizontal axis represents the crime choice in the previous year: 1 indicates the person did engage in criminal activities last year; 0 indicates 
he did not.
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
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Figure 2: Probability of Education by Lagged Education Choice and Age
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. The horizontal axis represents the education choice in the previous year: 1 indicates the person enrolled in school last year; 0 indicates he did not.
3. The box above each figure indicates age.
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Figure 3: Probability of Crime by Enrollment Status and Age
2. The horizontal axis represents the education choice: No indicates the person is not enrolled in school this year; Yes indicates he is.
3. The box above each figure indicates age.
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
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Notes:
Figure 4: Fraction of the Variance Explained by Skills
We estimate a two factor model with cognitive and social/emotional measures. For the cognitive system, the components of WASI 
and Stroop are modeled using a linear in parameters specification of the form:                                                              where j 
indexes the measure and i the individual. For the case of Trail Making we use an ordered model of the form                                                                                                                                          
                                                                                     For the social/emotional measures we use a linear in parameters 
specification of the form:                                                                  The figure plots the fraction of the variance explained by skills. 
For example, for matrix reasoning the fraction of the variance explained by cognitive skills is given by          





WAI-­‐Suppression	  of	  Agression	  
WAI-­‐Impulse	  Control*	  
Trail	  Making	  -­‐	  B	  






Cogni<ve	  	   Social/Emo<onal	   Uniqueness	  
M j ,icog = 1 ψ l < Ziβ jcog +θicogδ jcog + ξ j ,icog ≤ψ l+1( ).
Mk ,i,temo = Zi,tβk ,temo +θiemoδ k ,temo + ξk ,i,temo.
var θ cog( ) δ cog( )2
var θ cog( ) δ cog( )2 + var ξ cog( )
.
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1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the second figure, the treatment of preventing someone from committing crime implies that the average difference in the probability of crime between treated and non treated is equal to 
-1 in the year of intervention by construction.
Notes:
Figure 5: No Crime at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
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Figure 6: Enrolled at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
3. Note that for the first figure, the treatment of forcing enrollment in school implies that the average difference in the probability of education between treated and non treated is equal to 1 in the 
year of intervention by construction.
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Notes:
Figure 7: Enrolled at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of 
Property Crime
1. The figure is based on the property crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors 
for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal distribution. Crime and education 
decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over 
time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment 
rates.
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Figure 8: No Drug Use at Age 15 - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
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Figure 9: Move Cognitive Factor from 25th to 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probability of 
Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
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Figure 10: Move Social/Emotional Factor from 25th to 75th Percentile - Effect on Average Probability of 
Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
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Figure 11: No Drug Use (Permanently) - Effect on Average Probability of Education and Crime
Notes:
1. The figures are based on the overall crime category.
2. For each simulation, the exogenous variables are set to their median level at age 15. We then draw pairs of errors for the crime and education equations from the estimated bivariate normal 
distribution. Crime and education decisions are then computed using the estimated parameters from the baseline model, and updated sequentially over time for a period of 10 years. We do this for 
500,000 artificial agents and compute the average crime and enrollment rates.
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VARIABLES
Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0395* 0.0389* 0.0678*** 0.0392** 0.0542*** 0.0290 0.0526*** 0.0273 0.0175 0.0348* 0.0470** 0.0315
(0.0216) (0.0202) (0.0213) (0.0180) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0195) (0.0186) (0.0179) (0.0195) (0.0211) (0.0199)
Hispanic -0.0129 -0.0239 -0.0344** -0.0268* -0.0055 -0.0341** -0.0055 -0.0345** -0.0210* -0.0192 -0.0242* -0.0220
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0155)
Black 0.0394** -0.0291 -0.0014 -0.0373** 0.0408** -0.0471*** 0.0382** -0.0480*** 0.0023 -0.0333* 0.0213 -0.0349*
(0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0169) (0.0170) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0163) (0.0169) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0172) (0.0182)
Other 0.0420 -0.0154 0.0086 -0.0202 0.0324 -0.0260 0.0308 -0.0273 -0.0216 -0.0215 0.0348 -0.0237
(0.0272) (0.0299) (0.0268) (0.0282) (0.0260) (0.0279) (0.0260) (0.0279) (0.0220) (0.0303) (0.0270) (0.0302)
Female 0.0529*** -0.0961*** 0.1180*** -0.0973*** 0.0184 -0.0710*** 0.0182 -0.0682*** 0.0071 -0.0962*** 0.0592*** -0.1010***
(0.0150) (0.0163) (0.0149) (0.0157) (0.0150) (0.0158) (0.0150) (0.0159) (0.0116) (0.0163) (0.0147) (0.0163)
Non-intact Family -0.0486*** 0.0308** -0.0577*** 0.0227 -0.0301** 0.0155 -0.0299** 0.0139 -0.0038 0.0268* -0.0515*** 0.0294*
(0.0147) (0.0156) (0.0145) (0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0142) (0.0148) (0.0118) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0158)
Siblings -0.0017 0.0035 -0.0025 0.0039* -0.0013 0.0034 -0.0012 0.0036 -0.0044** 0.0043* -0.0020 0.0039
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025)
Age -0.0788*** -0.0261*** -0.0708*** -0.0322*** -0.0736*** -0.0324*** -0.0732*** -0.0324*** -0.0463*** -0.0343*** -0.0872*** -0.0247***
(0.0041) (0.0072) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0068) (0.0036) (0.0068) (0.0031) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0077)
Punish 0.0022 -0.0184*** 0.0066*** -0.0189*** -0.0009 -0.0166*** -0.0010 -0.0169*** 0.0054*** -0.0223*** 0.0027 -0.0220***
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0026)
Children -0.0173** 0.0027 -0.0160** 0.0079 -0.0151** 0.0116* -0.0133** 0.0119* -0.0249*** 0.0102 -0.0173** 0.0074
(0.0074) (0.0073) (0.0077) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0066) (0.0069) (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0074) (0.0074)
Family Crime 0.0015 0.1460*** -0.0335** 0.1440*** 0.0088 0.1310*** 0.0073 0.1330*** 0.0099 0.1460*** 0.0024 0.1490***
(0.0146) (0.0151) (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0136) (0.0137) (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0112) (0.0154) (0.0147) (0.0152)
Drug Use -0.0011 0.2040*** 0.0428*** 0.2260*** -0.0405*** 0.2330*** -0.0412*** 0.2320*** -0.0456*** 0.2300*** -0.0012 0.2240***
(0.0118) (0.0105) (0.0111) (0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0108) (0.0096) (0.0091) (0.0105) (0.0116) (0.0104)
Unemployment Rate 0.0212*** 0.0097* 0.0200*** 0.0122** 0.0225*** 0.0107** 0.0227*** 0.0101* 0.0176*** 0.0120** 0.0214*** 0.0106*
(0.0059) (0.0053) (0.0062) (0.0047) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0052) (0.0059) (0.0054)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0225* 0.0160 0.0192* -0.0291*** 0.0156 -0.0275*** 0.0158 -0.0269** 0.0177** -0.0259** 0.0197* -0.0240**
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0088) (0.0116) (0.0109) (0.0115)
Years of Crime -0.0066** 0.0171*** -0.0073*** 0.0208*** -0.0045* 0.0200*** -0.0051* 0.0217*** -0.0051** 0.0209***
(0.0026 (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0030) (0.0021) (0.0029)
Lagged Crime 0.1420*** 0.1590*** 0.1500*** 0.1630*** 0.1580***
(0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0117) (0.0136) (0.0126)
Years of Education 0.0060 -0.0050 0.0232*** -0.0038 -0.0075* -0.0008 -0.0024 -0.0025 0.0162*** 0.0033  
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0035) (0.0040)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1850*** 0.1730*** 0.1980*** 0.2230*** 0.0836***
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0114) (0.0131) (0.0099)
Enrollment 0.0958** 0.0561*** 0.0632 0.0684 0.0974*
(0.0470) (0.0157) (0.0465) (0.0461) (0.0563)
Change in Schools per Young Person 310.7000*** 166.7000** 318.3000*** 319.4000*** 120.8000* 318.3000***
(71.2600) (71.6300) (67.1200) (66.9600) (63.4000) (71.6000)
Cognitive Factor 0.0352* 0.0037 0.0075 0.0132 0.0052 0.0138 0.0040 0.0152 0.0386** 0.0136
(0.0185) (0.0181) (0.0177) (0.0180) (0.0176) (0.0180) (0.0153) (0.0199) (0.0189) (0.0198)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0152 -0.0765*** -0.0122 -0.0714*** -0.0131 -0.0714*** 0.0040 -0.0828*** 0.0025 -0.0808***
(0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0112) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0149)
Jail 0.1000*** 0.1180*** 0.3560*** 0.1600*
(0.0119) (0.0131) (0.0780) (0.0915)
Years of Crime * Jail 0.0027 -0.0066
(0.0047) (0.0050)
Years of Education * Jail -0.0196*** 0.0052
(0.0065) (0.0073)
Lagged Enrollment * Jail -0.0895***
(0.0231)
Lagged Crime * Jail -0.0521**
(0.0256)
Enrollment * Jail -0.0311
(0.0258)
Years of Crime * Age1 -0.0062 0.0217***
(0.0038) (0.0044)
Years of Crime * Age2 -0.0072** 0.0197***
(0.0029) (0.0034)
Years of Education * Age1 0.0019 -0.0029
(0.0048) (0.0050)
Years of Education * Age2 0.0092** -0.0036
(0.0044) (0.0044)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age1 0.2290***
(0.0200)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age2 0.1700***
(0.0162)




Table A1: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Overall Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)
Enrollment based on 
attendance 
(6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Age varying 
Coefficients
Table A1 (Continued): Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Overall Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)
Enrollment based on 
attendance 
(6)(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enrollment * Age2 0.0533
(0.0573)
Lagged Crime * Age1 0.1570***
(0.0188)
Lagged Crime * Age2 0.1610***
(0.0167)
WASI Reasoning Score -0.0017 -0.0048
(0.0064) (0.0067)
WASI Vocabulary Score 0.0004 0.0011
(0.0070) (0.0072)
Stroop: Color -0.0030 0.0143*
(0.0078) (0.0082)
Stroop: Word 0.0087 -0.0116
(0.0071) (0.0075)
Stroop: Color - Word 0.0040 -0.0103
(0.0069) (0.0072)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.0034 -0.0018
(0.0067) (0.0068)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.0164** -0.0071
(0.0069) (0.0071)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.0076 -0.0301***
(0.0074) (0.0075)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.0102 -0.0445***
(0.0072) (0.0073)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.0015 -0.0275***
(0.0062) (0.0063)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.0143 0.0227**
(0.0104) (0.0106)
PSMI - Identity 0.0355*** -0.0175*
(0.0103) (0.0106)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.0225** -0.0115
(0.0090) (0.0095)
Rho
Observations 5,190 5,190 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189 6,189 5,097 5,097 5,190 5,190
2. In column (1) we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and social/emotional ability with the measures used to infer them.  In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community 
school. In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime, and enrollment to allow the effect of previous 
experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In Column (5) enrollment is redefined as attending school for at least nine months. Coefficients are allowed to vary by age in 
specification (6). Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above.
-0.1570 -0.0704** -0.0899 -0.0831 -0.2280* -0.0858
(0.1110)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
(0.1050) (0.0327) (0.0999) (0.0992) (0.1240)
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VARIABLES
Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0329 -0.0137 0.0625*** -0.00303 0.0492** -0.0097 0.0482** -0.0117 0.0136 -0.0103 0.0420** -0.0160
(0.0218) (0.0158) (0.0215) (0.0141) (0.0197) (0.0145) (0.0196) (0.0145) (0.0182) (0.0150) (0.0212) (0.0153)
Hispanic -0.0105 -0.0271** -0.0319** -0.0148 -0.0053 -0.0189* -0.00519 -0.0192* -0.0194 -0.0236** -0.0238 -0.0213*
(0.0154) (0.0121) (0.0145) (0.0110) (0.0140) (0.0110) (0.0139) (0.0109) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0146) (0.0117)
Black 0.0435** -0.0119 -0.0056 -0.0002 0.0441*** -0.0080 0.0419** -0.0097 0.0016 -0.0098 0.0223 -0.0093
(0.0181) (0.0144) (0.0171) (0.0131) (0.0165) (0.0132) (0.0165) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0173) (0.0140)
Other 0.0418 -0.0103 0.0123 -0.0073 0.0328 -0.0089 0.0314 -0.0088 -0.0219 -0.0121 0.0359 -0.0140
(0.0277) (0.0247) (0.0273) (0.0233) (0.0266) (0.0231) (0.0265) (0.0231) (0.0224) (0.0246) (0.0274) (0.0245)
Female 0.0531*** -0.0993*** 0.1140*** -0.0919*** 0.0230 -0.0780*** 0.0232 -0.0764*** 0.0131 -0.1000*** 0.0615*** -0.1020***
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0114) (0.0144) (0.0143) (0.0143)
Non-intact Family -0.0513*** 0.0332*** -0.0614*** 0.0209* -0.0329** 0.0184 -0.0328** 0.0184 -0.0066 0.0299** -0.0539*** 0.0329***
(0.0149) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0119) (0.0144) (0.0118) (0.0144) (0.0119) (0.0120) (0.0127) (0.0148) (0.0127)
Siblings -0.0019 0.0001 -0.0023 -0.0012 -0.0019 -0.0012 -0.0017 -0.0011 -0.0044** -0.0005 -0.0022 0.0001
(0.0024) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0018) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0019)
Age -0.0796*** 0.0011 -0.0698*** -0.0090*** -0.0755*** -0.0033 -0.0750*** -0.0038 -0.0481*** -0.0121*** -0.0879*** 0.0004
(0.0040) (0.0052) (0.0040) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0035) (0.0050) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.0052) (0.0057)
Punish 0.0028 -0.0079*** 0.0067*** -0.0081*** 0.0000 -0.0072*** 0.0000 -0.0073*** 0.0061*** -0.0099*** 0.0031 -0.0104***
(0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.002) (0.0025) (0.0021)
Children -0.0158** 0.0074 -0.0126 0.0099* -0.0150** 0.0124** -0.0133** 0.0125** -0.0244*** 0.0117* -0.0162** 0.0085
(0.0075) (0.0058) (0.0078) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0054) (0.0067) (0.0055) (0.0079) (0.0059) (0.0075) (0.0058)
Family Crime 0.0000 0.0816*** -0.0294** 0.0778*** 0.0053 0.0689*** 0.0036 0.0689*** 0.0086 0.0833*** 0.0015 0.0833***
(0.0148) (0.0100) (0.0139) (0.0092) (0.0137) (0.0092 (0.0137) (0.0092) (0.0114) (0.0101) (0.0148) (0.0100)
Drug Use 0.0059 0.2030*** 0.0553*** 0.229*** -0.0384*** 0.2360*** -0.0397*** 0.2360*** -0.0450*** 0.2170*** 0.0060 0.2120***
(0.0120) (0.0095) (0.0114) (0.0085) (0.0111) (0.0085) (0.0111) (0.0085) (0.0094 (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0095)
Unemployment Rate 0.0206*** 0.0011 0.0202*** 0.0064* 0.0219*** 0.0039 0.0220*** 0.0039 0.0177*** 0.0064 0.0206*** 0.0026
(0.0060) (0.0043) (0.0062) (0.0039) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0055) (0.0041) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0060) (0.0044)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0238* 0.0068 0.0194* -0.0089 0.0147 -0.0074 0.0149 -0.0081 0.0173* -0.0068 0.0195* -0.0085
(0.0124) (0.0098) (0.0108) (0.0083) (0.0103) (0.0083) (0.0103) (0.0083) (0.0090) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0089)
Years of Crime -0.0113*** 0.0201*** -0.0210*** 0.0231*** -0.0018 0.0211*** -0.0026 0.0229*** -0.0033 0.0212***
(0.0036) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0030)
Lagged Crime 0.0920*** 0.0881*** 0.0859*** 0.0985*** 0.0988***
(0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0118) (0.0104)
Years of Education 0.0060 -0.0090*** 0.0222*** -0.0048 -0.0071* -0.0033 -0.0022 -0.0038 0.0172*** -0.0022
(0.0043) (0.0033) (0.0043) (0.0030) (0.0039) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0032)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1860*** 0.1780*** 0.1990*** 0.2230*** 0.0854***
(0.0125) (0.0130) (0.0115) (0.0131) (0.0101)
Enrollment 0.0883** -0.0020 0.0436 0.0396 -0.0046
(0.0344) (0.0125) (0.0345) (0.0347) (0.0481)
Change in Schools per Young Person 311.8000*** 143.8000** 323.5000*** 325.4000*** 139.8000** 331.1000***
(71.4900) (72.3800) (67.1800) (67.0700) (65.4700) (71.5900)
Cognitive Factor 0.0425** 0.0081 0.0128 0.0148 0.0105 0.0141 0.0085 0.0212 0.0483** 0.0123
(0.0187) (0.0141) (0.0179) (0.0140) (0.0179) (0.0141) (0.0157) (0.0152) (0.0192) (0.0151)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0115 -0.0232** -0.0111 -0.0214** -0.0118 -0.0218** 0.00776 -0.0272** 0.0015 -0.0263**
(0.0137) (0.0108) (0.0132) (0.0107) (0.0132) (0.0107) (0.0112) (0.0118) (0.0141) (0.0116)
Jail 0.1050*** 0.0625*** 0.3660*** 0.0668
(0.0122) (0.00956) (0.0761) (0.0651)
Years of Crime * Jail 0.0040 -0.0062
(0.0065) (0.0056)
Years of Education * Jail -0.0191*** 0.00219
(0.0065) (0.0053)
Lagged Enrollment * Jail -0.0884***
(0.0233)
Lagged Crime * Jail -0.0342*
(0.0200)
Enrollment * Jail -0.0006
(0.0189)
Years of Crime * Age1 -0.0163*** 0.0272***
(0.0055) (0.0051)
Years of Crime * Age2 -0.00763* 0.0190***
(0.0044) (0.0035)
Years of Education * Age1 0.0037 -0.0090**
(0.0046) (0.0035)
Years of Education * Age2 0.0089** -0.0089***
(0.0044) (0.0034)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age1 0.2270***
(0.0203)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age2 0.1710***
(0.0163)
Enrollment * Age1 0.0815**
(0.0360)
Table A2: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Drug-Related Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)




(6)(1) (2) (4)(3) (5)
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Table A2 (Continued): Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Drug-Related Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)




(6)(1) (2) (4)(3) (5)
Enrollment * Age2 0.0918**
(0.0449)
Lagged Crime * Age1 0.0721***
(0.0149)
Lagged Crime * Age2 0.1240***
(0.0149)
WASI Reasoning Score -0.0006 0.0008
(0.0064) (0.0051)
WASI Vocabulary Score 0.0020 -0.0016
(0.0070) (0.0055)
Stroop: Color -0.0037 0.0159**
(0.0079) (0.0063)
Stroop: Word 0.0101 -0.0038
(0.0072) (0.0061)
Stroop: Color - Word 0.0053 -0.0071
(0.0070) (0.0054)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.0042 0.0043
(0.0067) (0.0052)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.0180** 0.0039
(0.0069) (0.0054)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.0075 -0.0081
(0.0075) (0.0058)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.0105 -0.0251***
(0.0073) (0.0058)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.0000 -0.0116**
(0.0063) (0.0048)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.0135 0.0197**
(0.0105) (0.0080)
PSMI - Identity 0.0363*** -0.0294***
(0.0104) (0.0078)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.0255*** 0.0097
(0.0091) (0.0071)
Rho
Observations 5,074 5,074 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 6,042 4,987 4,987 5,074 5,074
-0.3200** 0.0289 -0.1730 -0.1590 -0.0528 -0.3170**
(0.1410)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
(0.1290) (0.0414) (0.1200) (0.1210) (0.1650)
2. In column (1) we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and social/emotional ability with the measures used to infer them.  In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community 
school. In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime, and enrollment to allow the effect of previous 
experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In Column (5) enrollment is redefined as attending school for at least nine months. Coefficients are allowed to vary by age in 
specification (6). Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above.
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Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0353 0.0433** 0.0620*** 0.0321* 0.0508*** 0.0258 0.0496** 0.0252 0.0111 0.0308 0.0414** 0.0270
(0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0213) (0.0184) (0.0195) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.0191) (0.0179) (0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0202)
Hispanic -0.0105 -0.0260 -0.0318** -0.0220 -0.0050 -0.0265* -0.0049 -0.0270* -0.0177 -0.0169 -0.0222 -0.0204
(0.0153) (0.0159) (0.0144) (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0117) (0.0156) (0.0146) (0.0155)
Black 0.0432** -0.0323* 0.0010 -0.0396** 0.0417** -0.0461*** 0.0392** -0.0464*** 0.0064 -0.0334* 0.0236 -0.0368**
(0.0180) (0.0187) (0.0169) (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0163) (0.0171) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0172) (0.0183)
Other 0.0461* -0.0065 0.0110 -0.0053 0.0341 -0.0071 0.0321 -0.0072 -0.0193 -0.0102 0.0382 -0.0127
(0.0273) (0.0302) (0.0268) (0.0283) (0.0261) (0.0281) (0.0260) (0.0281) (0.0221) (0.0303) (0.0270) (0.0303)
Female 0.0513*** -0.0748*** 0.1160*** -0.0794*** 0.0170 -0.0597*** 0.0177 -0.0584*** 0.0010 -0.0707*** 0.0570*** -0.0782***
(0.0150) (0.0169) (0.0149) (0.0164) (0.0150) (0.0165) (0.0150) (0.0166) (0.0117) (0.0170) (0.0147) (0.0170)
Non-intact Family -0.0461*** 0.0153 -0.0549*** 0.0104 -0.0282** 0.0054 -0.0284** 0.0044 -0.0034 0.0097 -0.0489*** 0.0117
(0.0146) (0.0157) (0.0145) (0.0150) (0.0142) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0150) (0.0117) (0.0158) (0.0146) (0.0160)
Siblings -0.0021 0.0039 -0.0028 0.0030 -0.0015 0.0026 -0.0014 0.0026 -0.0050** 0.0042 -0.0024 0.0039
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025)
Age -0.0794*** -0.0286*** -0.0715*** -0.0340*** -0.0739*** -0.0359*** -0.0733*** -0.0361*** -0.0454*** -0.0352*** -0.0876*** -0.0284***
(0.0040) (0.0073) (0.0040) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0068) (0.0035) (0.0068) (0.0030) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0077)
Punish 0.0025 -0.0156*** 0.0066*** -0.0169*** -0.0005 -0.0151*** -0.0006 -0.0152*** 0.0058*** -0.0196*** 0.0029 -0.0194***
(0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0027) (0.0025 (0.0027)
Children -0.0169** 0.0029 -0.0153** 0.0082 -0.0153** 0.0107 -0.0136** 0.0104 -0.0241*** 0.0071 -0.0170** 0.0075
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0076) (0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0071) (0.0065) (0.0071) (0.0076) (0.0077) (0.0073) (0.0075)
Family Crime 0.0035 0.1260*** -0.0319** 0.1370*** 0.0110 0.1260*** 0.0096 0.1280*** 0.0116 0.1280*** 0.0049 0.1310***
(0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0111) (0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0145)
Drug Use -0.0043 0.1380*** 0.0396*** 0.1610*** -0.0429*** 0.1650*** -0.0440*** 0.1650*** -0.0426*** 0.1660*** -0.0045 0.1600***
(0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.0103) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0107) (0.0104) (0.0090) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0111)
Unemployment Rate 0.0213*** 0.0052 0.0196*** 0.0065 0.0227*** 0.0059 0.0228*** 0.0054 0.0171*** 0.0059 0.0214*** 0.0050
(0.0059) (0.0055) (0.0062) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0059) (0.0056)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0223* 0.0118 0.0186* -0.0308*** 0.0144 -0.0293*** 0.0146 -0.0287*** 0.0180** -0.0259** 0.0189* -0.0239**
(0.0121) (0.0127) (0.0106) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.00878) (0.0117) (0.0109) (0.0116)
Years of Crime -0.0065*** 0.0170*** -0.0074*** 0.0215*** -0.0047** 0.0204*** -0.0046* 0.0204*** -0.0067*** 0.0221***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0029) (0.0019) (0.0027)
Lagged Crime 0.1250*** 0.1480*** 0.1450*** 0.1600*** 0.1420***
(0.0122) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0137) (0.0124)
Years of Education 0.0062 -0.0003 0.0233*** -0.0006 -0.0072* 0.0021 -0.0022 -0.0006 0.0147*** 0.0055
(0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0042) (0.0045) (0.0035) (0.0041)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1850*** 0.1730*** 0.1990*** 0.2240*** 0.0849***
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0101)
Enrollment 0.1060** 0.0726*** 0.0630 0.0549 0.1260**
(0.0470) (0.0157) (0.0468) (0.0467) (0.0617)
Change in Schools per Young Person 319.3000*** 180.9000** 325.9000*** 327.0000*** 126.0000** 326.9000***
(71.1100) (71.5100) (67.0200) (66.8600) (63.5400) (71.4300)
Cognitive Factor 0.0400** 0.0122 0.0131 0.0207 0.0105 0.0219 0.0111 0.0261 0.0446** 0.0248
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0176) (0.0183) (0.0152) (0.0200) (0.0189) (0.0199)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0159 -0.0702*** -0.0120 -0.0667*** -0.0127 -0.0663*** 0.0023 -0.0735*** 0.0027 -0.0732***
(0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0132) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0138) (0.0111) (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0150)
Jail 0.1000*** 0.0897*** 0.374*** 0.0042
(0.0119) (0.0130) (0.0770) (0.0892)
Years of Crime * Jail 0.0000 -0.0011
(0.0045) (0.0049)
Years of Education * Jail -0.0195*** 0.0097
(0.0064) (0.0071)
Lagged Enrollment * Jail -0.0882***
(0.0230)
Lagged Crime * Jail -0.0499**
(0.0246)
Enrollment * Jail 0.0196
(0.0256)
Years of Crime * Age1 -0.0070** 0.0195***
(0.0034) (0.0041)
Years of Crime * Age2 -0.0070** 0.0217***
(0.0028) (0.0033)
Years of Education * Age1 0.0023 0.0025
(0.0046) (0.0048)
Years of Education * Age2 0.0090** 0.0002
(0.0044) (0.0045)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age1 0.2280***
(0.0201)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age2 0.1710***
(0.0162)
Enrollment * Age1 0.0836*
(0.0495)
Table A3: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Violent Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)




(6)(1) (2) (4)(3) (5)
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Table A3 (Continued): Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Violent Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)




(6)(1) (2) (4)(3) (5)
Enrollment * Age2 0.0495
(0.0578)
Lagged Crime * Age1 0.1410***
(0.0176)
Lagged Crime * Age2 0.1470***
(0.0175)
WASI Reasoning Score 0.0004 -0.0050
(0.0064) (0.0067)
WASI Vocabulary Score -0.0016 -0.0087
(0.0070) (0.0073)
Stroop: Color -0.0023 0.0081
(0.0077) (0.0081)
Stroop: Word 0.0099 -0.0033
(0.0070) (0.0075)
Stroop: Color - Word 0.0039 -0.0019
(0.0069) (0.0072)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.0034 -0.0012
(0.0067) (0.0069)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.0165** -0.0065
(0.0068) (0.0071)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.0085 -0.0248***
(0.0073) (0.0075)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.0106 -0.0586***
(0.0072) (0.0074)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.0013 -0.0271***
(0.0062) (0.0063)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.0142 0.0126
(0.0103) (0.0106)
PSMI - Identity 0.0351*** -0.0080
(0.0103) (0.0106)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.0215** 0.0039
(0.0090) (0.0093)
Rho
Observations 5,232 5,232 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 6,236 5,139 5,139 5,232 5,232
-0.1590 -0.0851*** -0.0540 -0.0513 -0.2690* -0.0801
(0.1090)
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
(0.1040) (0.0321) (0.0979) (0.0982) (0.1370)
2. In column (1) we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and social/emotional ability with the measures used to infer them.  In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community 
school. In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime, and enrollment to allow the effect of previous 
experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In Column (5) enrollment is redefined as attending school for at least nine months. Coefficients are allowed to vary by age in 
specification (6). Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above.
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VARIABLES
Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime Education Crime
Phoenix 0.0459** 0.0462*** 0.0730*** 0.0683*** 0.0586*** 0.0674*** 0.0575*** 0.0675*** 0.0178 0.0523*** 0.0524** 0.0543***
(0.0218) (0.0175) (0.0215) (0.0156) (0.0196) (0.0162) (0.0196) (0.0162) (0.0180) (0.0168) (0.0212) (0.0172)
Hispanic -0.0127 -0.0107 -0.0335** -0.0248** -0.0053 -0.0269** -0.0056 -0.0270** -0.0210* -0.0147 -0.0231 -0.0133
(0.0154) (0.0129) (0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0118) (0.0140) (0.0118) (0.0119) (0.0127) (0.0147) (0.0126)
Black 0.0392** -0.0008 -0.0036 -0.0208 0.0413** -0.0236 0.0389** -0.0232 0.0013 -0.0087 0.0209 -0.0093
(0.0179) (0.0156) (0.0170) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0163) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0154) (0.0172) (0.0153)
Other 0.0424 0.0210 0.0104 -0.0091 0.0337 -0.0081 0.0310 -0.0087 -0.0237 0.0124 0.0358 0.0166
(0.0274) (0.0245) (0.0270) (0.0236) (0.0263) (0.0236) (0.0262) (0.0237) (0.0223) (0.0249) (0.0271) (0.0248)
Female 0.0601*** -0.0208 0.126*** -0.0239* 0.0242* -0.0135 0.0250* -0.0121 0.0113 -0.0267* 0.0674*** -0.0232*
(0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0143) (0.0135) (0.0145) (0.0137) (0.0145) (0.0138) (0.0112) (0.0139) (0.0142) (0.0140)
Non-intact Family -0.0460*** 0.0049 -0.0553*** 0.0031 -0.0277* 0.0004 -0.0281** -0.0005 -0.0029 0.0082 -0.0486*** 0.0067
(0.0146) (0.0130) (0.0145) (0.0123) (0.0142) (0.0123) (0.0141) (0.0124) (0.0118) (0.0131) (0.0146) (0.0131)
Siblings -0.0026 0.0024 -0.0035 0.0027 -0.0021 0.0025 -0.0019 0.0026 -0.0045** 0.0025 -0.0030 0.0022
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0021)
Age -0.0809*** -0.0254*** -0.0730*** -0.0244*** -0.0749*** -0.0266*** -0.0742*** -0.0268*** -0.0467*** -0.0260*** -0.0902*** -0.0236***
(0.0039) (0.0061) (0.0039) (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0030) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0065)
Punish 0.0027 -0.0129*** 0.0069*** -0.0134*** 0.0000 -0.0126*** -0.0002 -0.0129*** 0.0061*** -0.0154*** 0.0033 -0.0154***
(0.0025) (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0023)
Children -0.0167** -0.0023 -0.0163** 0.0018 -0.0155** 0.0031 -0.0137** 0.0021 -0.0234*** -0.0009 -0.0168** 0.0003
(0.0074) (0.0065) (0.0076) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0062) (0.0066) (0.0063) (0.0077) (0.0066) (0.0073) (0.0065)
Family Crime 0.0010 0.0904*** -0.0347** 0.0908*** 0.0085 0.0856*** 0.0072 0.0871*** 0.0098 0.0966*** 0.0020 0.0950***
(0.0146) (0.0111) (0.0137) (0.0103) (0.0136) (0.0104) (0.0135) (0.0103) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0146) (0.0112)
Drug Use -0.00480 0.1260*** 0.0389*** 0.1540*** -0.0441*** 0.1560*** -0.0452*** 0.1550*** -0.0443*** 0.1390*** -0.0066 0.1430***
(0.0117) (0.0094) (0.0110) (0.0086) (0.0107) (0.0088) (0.0107) (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0104) (0.0114) (0.0094)
Unemployment Rate 0.0218*** 0.0079* 0.0204*** 0.0118*** 0.0232*** 0.0121*** 0.0234*** 0.0121*** 0.0169*** 0.0103** 0.0220*** 0.0102**
(0.0059) (0.0047) (0.0062) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0045) (0.0054) (0.0046) (0.0059) (0.0048)
Future Outlook Inventory 0.0219* 0.00271 0.0180* -0.0374*** 0.0133 -0.0365*** 0.0136 -0.0370*** 0.0166* -0.0335*** 0.0187* -0.0334***
(0.0122) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.00913) (0.0101) (0.00913) (0.0101) (0.00912) (0.00885) (0.00992) (0.0109) (0.0098)
Years of Crime -0.0034 0.0149*** -0.0046* 0.0180*** -0.0024 0.0180*** -0.0019 0.0194*** -0.0037* 0.0185***
(0.0024) (0.0023) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Lagged Crime 0.1320*** 0.1440*** 0.1410*** 0.1580*** 0.1460***
(0.0102) (0.00958) (0.00956) (0.0117) (0.0103)
Years of Education 0.0066 0.0031 0.0236*** 0.0041 -0.0073* 0.0058* -0.0022 0.0052 0.0152*** 0.0042
(0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0043) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0035) (0.0035)
Lagged Enrollment 0.1860*** 0.1750*** 0.2000*** 0.2230*** 0.0896***
(0.0123) (0.0129) (0.0113) (0.0129) (0.0098)
Enrollment -0.0111 -0.0058 -0.0175 -0.0286 -0.0754
(0.0396) (0.0134) (0.0377) (0.0374) (0.0494)
Change in Schools per Young Person 314.5000*** 175.2000** 323.4000*** 323.6000*** 130.5000** 327.6000***
(71.2800) (71.6000) (66.7600) (66.6200) (63.5600) (71.5800)
Cognitive Factor 0.0368** 0.0061 0.0113 0.0100 0.0086 0.0110 0.0090 0.0130 0.0417** 0.0188
(0.0185) (0.0155) (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0176) (0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0168) (0.0189) (0.0166)
Social/Emotional Factor 0.0134 -0.0630*** -0.0116 -0.0617*** -0.0123 -0.0613*** 0.00379 -0.0643*** 0.00180 -0.0664***
(0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0134) (0.0119) (0.0113) (0.0130) (0.0143) (0.0128)
Jail 0.1000*** 0.0440*** 0.3870*** 0.0578
(0.0119) (0.0106) (0.0774) (0.0736)
Years of Crime * Jail -0.0017 -0.0045
(0.0043) (0.0041)
Years of Education * Jail -0.0200*** 0.0018
(0.0064) (0.0058)
Lagged Enrollment * Jail -0.0862***
(0.0229)
Lagged Crime * Jail -0.0499**
(0.0205)
Enrollment * Jail 0.0201
(0.0215)
Years of Crime * Age1 -0.0046 0.0241***
(0.0034) (0.0033)
Years of Crime * Age2 -0.0026 0.0141***
(0.0028) (0.0028)
Years of Education * Age1 0.0034 0.0037
(0.0045) (0.0040)
Years of Education * Age2 0.0095** 0.0056
(0.0043) (0.0038)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age1 0.2280***
(0.0199)
Lagged Enrollment *  Age2 0.1720***
(0.0162)
Enrollment * Age1 -0.0322
(0.0405)
Table A4: Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Property Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)
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Table A4 (Continued): Average Marginal Effects from Probits for Crime and Education (Property Crime)
Cognitive and 
Behavioral Ability
Choices while in Jail 
(1)
Choices while in Jail 
(2)
Choices while in Jail 
(3)




(6)(1) (2) (4)(3) (5)
Enrollment * Age2 -0.0456
(0.0459)
Lagged Crime * Age1 0.1310***
(0.0140)
Lagged Crime * Age2 0.1580***
(0.0159)
WASI Reasoning Score 0.0006 0.0011
(0.0064) (0.0056)
WASI Vocabulary Score -0.0027 0.0131**
(0.0070) (0.0060)
Stroop: Color -0.0005 0.0046
(0.0077)  '(0.0068)
Stroop: Word 0.0082 -0.0024
(0.0070) (0.0063)
Stroop: Color - Word 0.0033 -0.0110*
(0.0069) (0.0060)
Trail-Making: Part A -0.0035 0.0002
(0.0066) (0.0058)
Trail-Making: Part B -0.0163** -0.0069
(0.0068) (0.0059)
WAI - Impulse Response -0.0073 -0.0302***
(0.0074) (0.0063)
WAI - Suppression of Aggression 0.0127* -0.0286***
(0.0071) (0.0064)
WAI - Consideration of Others 0.0011 -0.0220***
(0.0062) (0.0053)
PSMI - Self Reliance -0.0131 0.0122
(0.0103) (0.0087)
PSMI - Identity 0.0349*** -0.0124
(0.0102) (0.0085)
PSMI - Work Orientation -0.0244*** -0.0152**
(0.0090) (0.0075)
Rho 0.0408 0.0035 0.0245 0.0363 0.1740 0.1110
(0.119) (0.0361) (0.1060) (0.1060) (0.1470) (0.1210)
Observations 5,232 5,232 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 6,231 5,141 5,141 5,232 5,232
Notes:
1. Standard errors are reported below the point estimates in italics and in parentheses. *** stands for p-value<0.01, ** stands for p-value<0.05, *  stands for p-value<0.1.
2. In column (1) we replace our factor estimates of cognitive and social/emotional ability with the measures used to infer them.  In column (2), enrollment is set to zero if an individual did not attend a community 
school. In column (3), we condition on whether the individual is interviewed in jail, and in column (4) we interact the jail dummy with years of education, years of crime, and enrollment to allow the effect of previous 
experience and contemporaneous enrollment to vary with whether the individual is in jail. In Column (5) enrollment is redefined as attending school for at least nine months. Coefficients are allowed to vary by age in 
specification (6). Age1 is a dummy for ages 14 to 19, and Age2 is a dummy for ages 20 and above.
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